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THE RELATIONSHIP OF DISSOCIATION AND REPRESSION 
CONSIDERED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF 
MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
OBJECT OF THESIS. 
The object of this thesis is to consider the 
conceptions of Dissociation and Repression with a 
view to determining in What way, i~ any, the processa 
~ .... , .. ,._ 
are related to one another. These two conceptions 
have played a part of unrivalled importance in modern 
psycho-pathology, but no satisfactory attempt seams 
to have bean made to determine the exact natura of 
their relationship to one another. The conclusions 
reached in this thesis regarding their relationship 
~onatitute, so far as the writer is aware, an origina 
contribution to the subject. 
I MEDIOINE AND PSYCHOLOGY. 
The task imposed by the aim of this thesis 
involves an exploration of ground Which ie common to 
medical science and psychology. While these two 
sciences are rightly dif'f'arentiated from one another 
both as regards aim and subject matter, an unnatural 
divorce between them is detrimental to the interests 
of both. The subject matter of medicine ie disease 
in the human organism, and ita aim ie twofold:-
{a)/ 
2. 
(a) to understand the natura of disease (The Science 
of Medicine); (b) to devise and apply methods of cure 
(The Art of Medicine). On the other hand, the sub_ 
ject matter of psychology is the behaviour of the 
organism; and ~ts aim is to interpret behaviour in 
terms of i~er experience~ The "mental processes" 
of which the psychologist speaks are the laws of 
behaviour interpreted in such terms, and the study of 
these processaa constitutes the science of Psychology 
Corresponding to the Art of Medicine we may also 
recognise an Applied Psychology, the object of Which 
is to apply knowledge of mental laws to the solution 
of various problems of life. Although the science of 
medicine and the science of psychology are thus dis-
tinct, there is a considera.ble area of' common ground 
in their respective provinces. After all, disease 
is not an entity. \Vhen disease is present, it is the 
organism that is diseased; and the presence of dieeae 
affects the organism's behaviour, Which is the sub_ 
ject matter of psychology. Further, there are 
certain types of disease in which the chief symptoms 
are aberrations of' behaviour. Conspicuous among 
such disea.sas is that group Which is commonly designs 
ted '•Functional Nervous Diseaae'1 :- a group which 
includes the psycho-neuroses and certain of· the 
insanities. It is in relation to this group of 
diseases that a knowledge of the laws of behaviour 
is/ 
is cif particular value to medical science. As a 
matter of fact, Whatever debt medicine already owes 
to psychology is due largely to the light Which 
psychology hae thrown upon the nature of these dis-
eases. It may be added that the debt ie not one_ 
sided, and that the study of this group of abnormal 
phenomena by clinicians has exercised a profound 
influence upon the psychology of normal mental pro_ 
cesses. 
Although during the la~t thirty yaars there has 
been unmistakable evidence of a rapprochement between 
medicine and psychology to the mutual benefit of each 
it is none the lees true to say that the two sciences 
have not yet recovered from the effects of an un_ 
natural divorce. The divorce between medi·cine and 
psychology is of comparatively recent origin. If we 
trace back the history of both sciences, we find that 
they have a common origin in Religion. Among primi_ 
tive peoples the doctor is the witch-doctor. Disease 
is attributed to the influence of Hspirite", and 
treatment proceeds on linea conforming to this belie • 
The measures which are taken to combat disease are 
such as are calculated to influence the spirits 
concerned. Since these spirits are anthropomorphical y 
conceived, it is easy to understand that primitive 
medicine is ultimately based upon the conceptions of 
human mental process prevalent in the community. 
Medicine/ 
4. 
Medicine and psychology are thus aaan to derive their 
lineage from a common source. They are both children 
of the primitive animistic conception of the universe 
Even after the day when physical ecia~ca began to 
evolve out of magic and the effects of physical force 
in causing disease began to be realised, the an1m1et1 
theory of disease waa only vary gradually abandoned. 
The physical and animistic theories existed aide by 
aide, and the :former only gradually grew at the 
expense of the latter. In Greek and Roman times it 
is true that a medical science basad on physical con-
captions reached a high degree of development, but 
the medical man had a formidable rival in the priest 
of Aesculapius. Even after the dawn of the Chrieti 
era medicine remained intimately connected with 
religion. The development o:f Arabian Medicine perha s 
constitutes an exc·eption to this generalisation, but 
this was only a more or lees localised interlude. 
In Christian countries medicine remained a prerogati a 
of the Church. It was only after the Renaissance ha 
stimulated interest in physical science that a prope 
science of medicine based on physical conceptions 
began to establish itself on a solid :foundation. 
T.hia movement reached a climax towards the close of 
the XIXth Century, when the rise of physiology and 
neurology inclined medical men to interpret all form 
of disease, including mental disease, .in exclusively 
physical/ 
physical terms. This phase hae by no means passed, 
but in the latter part o~ the XIXth Century a reactio 
against extreme materialistic conceptions of disease 
began to make itself felt in the medical world. This 
reaction was the outcome of considerations resulting 
:from the a tudy of two groups of phenomena:- (a) the 
phenomena o~ Hypnotism, (b) the phenomena of Hysteria 
The scientific study o~ hypnotism may be said to 
have begun when Meemer astonished the cultured circle 
of' Vienna in the latter part of the XVIIIth Century 
by introducing them to the phenomena o~ so-called 
'Animal Magnetism'. The prejudices of' the medical 
and scianti~ic world and the extravagances of the 
Mesmerists themselves led to the discrediting of the 
whole subject, but it is interesting to note that th 
explanation put forward by Mesmar to account for the 
phenomena was a physical ona. He attributed them to 
the action of 'magnetic fluid'. No further light w s 
thrown upon the subject until the time of Jamas Braid, 
the Manchester surgeon, Who in 1843 embarked upon an 
investigation of' the phenomena o~ mesmerism. Thasa 
ha was at ~irst inclined to regard as the affects of 
fatigue, and the explanation which he offered was 
couched in physiological terms. Later, however, he 
substituted a psychological explanation, in accordan a 
with Which "suggestionff was regarded as the main age t 
in producing the hypnotic state. T.he view that the 
hypnotic/ 
e. 
hypnotic state was due to suggestion created little 
interest until it was revived by Professor Bernneim o 
. I 
Nancy, who, under the inspiration of Liabaault, 
published hie book "De la Suggestion" in 1884. 
T.ha Nanoy School held that hypnotism was simply 
normal sleep induced by suggestion and that it could 
be produced in any individual by suitable methods. 
There arose, however, a school of investigators in 
I Paris who took up ·a somewhat different view. This 
/' '· 
was the school of the Salpatriere Clinique, among Who 
the leading figure was J.M. Charcot (182n-93). 
Charcot's investigations ware conducted among the 
nervous patients Who attended the clinique, and this 
fact doubtless explains the conclusion Which he drew 
as to the natura of hypnotism. He recognised the 
intimate connection of hypnotism and suggestion, but 
ha regar~ed both as pathological. Ha regarded them 
as phenomena of hysteria. The acrimonious oontro_ 
verey which arose between the Nancy and Salp~triere 
schools as a result of the divergence of their views 
is happily now an affair of the past. It is now 
generally agreed that both views embodied a truth, 
but that neither view was wholly true. It is to the 
Nancy School that we owe recognition of the facta 
that suggestion may take.affeot in a normal·individu 
and that there is an intimate connection between 
suggestion and hypnotism. 
school,/ 
,... '· 
It is to the Salpetriere 
7. 
school, on the other hand, that we owe the knowledge 
that increased suggestibility is a charaotarietio of 
certain pathological states, of Which hysteria is the 
most notable. It is to the Salpetriara also that we 
owe those researches Which have led to recognition of 
the part played in functional nervous disease by 
psychological processes. 
/··. '• 
The outstanding :figure o:f the Salpetriara School 
was undoubtedly Charcot (vide Fraud, 'Collected Paper ', 
1924, Vol.I, Paper on 'Charcot'). While Charcot was 
essentially a neurologist, hie clinical insight lad 
him to recognise that it was impossible to disregard 
the importance of mental processes, so far, at any 
rata; as hysteria was concerned. In hie introduction 
to the famous work on hysteria by his pupil, Janat, 
ha expresses his opinion in these words:_ "L'hyeteria 
eat an grande partia una maladia mentala". It was, 
however, in the influence which he exerted upon two 
of hie pupils rather than in hie ow·n views upon 
fUnctional nervous disease that hie importance for 
psychopathology chiefly lies. These pupils ware 
Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud. It is upon the work 
of these two men that the whole structure of modern. 
psychopathology is founded. 
Although Janet and Freud both owe their inepira_ 
tion to a common master, their researches have led 
them along different paths. T.ha starting point for 
the researches of both was the disease to Which 
Charcot's! 
s. 
Charcot's clinical teaching had directed their atten_. 
tion, viz. hysteria; but Janat in Paris and Fr~ud in 
Vienna each pursued hie own path mora or less indif_ 
farent to the other. Both modified Charoot'e pro_ 
nounoement that "Hysteria is in great part a mental 
disease" into the proposition that hysteria ie 
essentially a mental disease (Janat, "L'Etat Mental 
dea Hysteriquaa", 1911, p. 447; Fraud, "Collected 
Papers", Vol.I., p.Fi5). Each reached the conolueion 
that all the hydra-headed symptomatology of hysteria 
was the expression of one fUndamental psychological 
process. They differed, however, in their views as 
to the nature of this process, as well as in the 
Which they adopted to describe it. Janet developed 
the conception of "Dissociation", while Freud develop d 
that of 'Repression'. 
The independence of' the paths, Which,ae a matter 
of history, these two investigators have pursued in 
the formulation of their views, has led to a situatio 
Which ia not altogether satisfactory eo far as medica 
scienoe is concerned. It has led to a division of' 
medical thought into two camps, so far as functional 
nervous diseases are concerned. Between these two 
camps there is very little coming and going. One 
school interprets functional nervous disease in terms 
I 
of the process of dissociation, the other in terms 0 
the process of repression. The two conceptions are 
thus/ 
9. 
thue generally regarded as alternatives for purposes 
of explanation, though, as Rivers points out 
("Instinct and the Unconscious", 1924, p.71. ), soma 
writers seem to use the two terms indifferently, with 
out considering Whether the conceptions involved are 
identical ~ not. In psychological circles, on the 
other hand, the situation is different. Both concep-
tions have bean widely adopted into psychology, but, 
as far as psychologists are concerned, it would be as 
untrue to say that they are regarded as alternatives 
as it would be to say that they are regarded as 
identical. It remains true, however, that little 
attempt has bean made, either in medical or psycho-
logical circles, to consider what relationship, i~ 
any, exists between the two processes o~ dissociatio 
and repression. It is the aim of the present thesis 
to attempt to supply this want. 
DISSOCIATION AND REPRESSIQJ. 
While it is true to say that little attempt has 
bean made either by medical writers or psychologists 
to consider the relationship of dissociation and 
repression, it would be ·incorrect to say that no suo 
attempt has bean made at all. Of the att~mpts made 
the moat notable are those of Dr W.H.R. Rivers and 
Professor William Me Dougall. It is interesting to 




Rivers' views upon this subject are to be found 
in Chapter X of hie "Instinct and the Unconscious". 
There he axpreseae hie view that dissociation is 
essentially a state rasul ting f'rom "euppreeeion~ .:-
;"suppression" being the tenn Rivers employe to describ 
the process of "repression" as ordinarily understood •. 
Ha thus uses the term "dissociation" to describe a 
state in which suppressed experience may persist. 
He conceives it not as a passive state, but as a stat 
characterised by independent activity of the rapresee 
elements. He further assumes that this independent 
activity carries with it independent consciousness 
(Rivers, "Instinct and the Unconscious", 1924, p. 78.) 
From this summary it is plain that Rivers had a very 
definite idea of the relationship of dissociation and 
repression, but hie view of this relationship ca~ot 
be regarded as satisfactory. It ie unsatisfactory fo 
several reasons:-
1. The first point which invitee criticism is 
the narrowness of hie conception of dissociation. 
The fact that this narrowness is the result of' a 
deliberately imposed limitation in no way ~inirnises 
the defect. That it was deliberately imposed is 
evident from the following quotation (Op. cit. p.7e) 
"I propose therefore to uee the term 'diseociatio 
not merely for a process and state in which sup_ 
pressed experience acquir~s an independent act-
ivity,/ 
11. 
activity, but shall assume that this independent 
activity carries with it independent consciouenes • 
In some cases in Which we have obviously to do 
with independent activity as shown by behaviour, 
it may not be possible to demonstrate the exist-
ence of independent and dissociated consciousness 
but I believe it will be convenient to limit the 
term 'dissociation' to cases where there is 
evidence of this independent consciousness." 
By thus limiting dissociation to oases where there is 
evidence of independent consciousness, Rivers exclude 
many phenomena Which seam beet explained in terms of 
this process. The undesirability of confining the 
use of the term 'dissociation' to cases Where there 
is evidence of independent coneoiousnaea will be 
shown in due course-. 
2. If Rivers' conception of dissociation is 
sUbject to criticism, the same holds true of hie 
conception of repression, or, as he prefers to call 
:tt, 'suppression'. 'suppression' ie conceived by 
Rivers as the psychological correlate of that phyeio 
logical function of' inh.ibi tion, which the ·higher and 
later evolved elements of the nervous system exercis 
over the lower and mora fundamental structures • 
"The suppression which I have bean considering in 
the la at two chap tars'', he wri tee, "1 a only one a ape t 
of/ 
12. 
of the universal physiological property of inhibition' 
(Op. cit. p.31). This identification ie perhaps the 
natural result of Rivers' researches in collaboration 
with Henry Head end J. Sherran on the physiology of 
the nervous system; but that it involves a stultifyin 
of the conception of repression will be aho\vn later, 
when the natura of repression is discussed. That euc 
a process of inhibition as· Rivers describes does 
actually exist need not be disputed. The raeea.rohes 
of Head and hie colleagues leave no room for doubt 
about the existence of a physiological process of thi 
nature; and psychologists universally recognise the 
existence of an analogous process, for Which they 
too employ the term 'inhibition'. It must be in.. 
sisted, however, that this process is not the process 
of' repression. 
3. The third great weakness of Rivers' position 
follows from those to which attention hae already bee 
drawn. It lies in the fe,ct that he regards dieaocia_ 
tion aa a. narrower concept than repression. That ha 
does eo is evident from the following paseage:-
"I aeeume, therefore, that euppreeaio.n often 
exiets without anything which we can regard as 
dissociation, that in many cases the suppressed 
content eXhibits no form of independent activity 
with no evidence that it is accompanied by any 
form of coneoiousneeaH. (Op. oit. p.77.) 
Since,/ 
13. 
since, in hie opinion, dissociation ia a state re-
sulting ~rom repression, it is obvious from this 
passage that, of the two concepte,dieeociation ie 
taken by Ri vera to be vary much the narrower. It 
will be one of the main objects of thie thesis to 
show that this interpretation of their relationship 
is the reverse o~ the truth. 
The moat recant attempt to formulate the re-
lationship between dissociation and repression ia 
that found in Professor McDougall'a "Outline o~ 
Abnormal Psychology" (1926). The difference between 
McDougall' e formulation and that of Rivers is well 
shown by the following quota.tion :from the book in 
queation:-
"There are good grounds for distinguishing the 
process of repression ~rom that o:f dissociation, 
aa also the state of continued repression :from 
a continuing state of dissociation" (op. cit. 
p.234). 
According to McDougall, therefore, the two processes 
are radically and f'undamenta.lly dis tin et. Indeed th 
distinction between them constitutes the keynote of 
hie book. He erects upon it a tentative claesifica_ 
tion of the functional nervous disorders. In this 
classification he distinguishes two groups of die_ 
orders:- one group characterised by dissociation , 
the other by repression. The chief representatives 
of/ 
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of the group characterised by dissociation are 
hysteria among the psychoneuroses and manic-dapreesiv 
insanity among the peychoeee. T.he group characterise 
by repression includes neurasthenia and obseaaional 
neurosis on the one hand, and dementia. praecox and 
paranoia on the other. In formulating hie views 
upon this subject, MoDougall appears to have been 
markedly influenced by the theories of Dr e.G. Jung 
tt of Zurich, and in particular by Jung's theory of 
psychological types. This theory was originally 
expounded by Jung in his "Analytical Psychology" 
(1916), and more recently in his work entitled 
••psychological Types" (1924 ). As is well known, Jun 
distinguishes two main temperamental types:- the 
Extrovert and the Introvert. 
A person, he says, "is extroverted when he givae 
hie fundamental interest to the outer or object_ 
ive world, and attributes an all-important and 
essential value to it: he is introverted, on the 
contrary, when the objective world suffers a sor 
of depreciation, or want of consideration for , 
the sake of the exaltation of the individual 
. 
himself, Who then monopolising all the interest , 
grows to believe no one but himself worthy of 
consideration." (Jung. "Analytical Psychology", 
2nd Ed. 1917. p.288). 
Jung'a distinction between these two types was based 
upon/ 
upon a study of the mentality of hysteria and dementi 
praecox. 
His studies led him to infer a temparamenta 
difference between these two types of patients, and, 
starting from this observation, he was led to extend 
this classification to normal persons. · The extro-
vert temperament was regarded as predisposing to 
hysteria, the introvert temperament to dementia prae-
cox. McDougall appears to have been impressed by 
tha appositeness of this classification; and he pro-
ceeded to adopt it with this modification, that, 
instead of recognising two distinct types, he con_ 
ceived a temperamental scala with the extreme extro-
vert at one and and the extreme introvert at the othe • 
This modification, however, did not affect the broad 
linea of Jung's classification, and McDougall'e 
rurthar views appear to have been developed on this 
basis. Accepting Janet'a observation th~t die-
eociation was a characteristic of hysteria, he looked 
around for a process Which might be regarded as 
characteristic of dementia praecox. Thie he found 
in the Freudian prooeas of repression. Once these 
two processes had been attached·to Jung's two psycho-
logical types, a place was found in the scheme for 
other functional affections besides hysteria and 
dementia praecox. 
The theory of fUnctional nervous diseases Whio , 
MoDougall was thus lad to erect under the influence 
of/ 
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of Jung, was not without support derived from his own 
findings. He regarded it as supported not only by 
the clinical observation of patients suffering from 
the various ~ctional disorders, but also by strikin 
experimental evidence. One train of evidence was 
deri~ed from hie experience that the extrovert type 
was more susceptible to hf!>noais the.n the introvert 
type. This conformed with the statements of Charcot 
and Janet that dissociation and liability to hypnosis 
were both distinctive characteristics of the hysteric 
and with his own finding that in neurasthenia and 
dementia praecox hypnosis was peculiarly difficult to 
produce. 
Another train of evidence was derived from a 
consideration of the bearing of experiments which he 
had conducted in the years 1912-14 on the influence 
of stimUlant and depressant drugs upon mental process 
(vide Op. ci t. p. 444 ). The experimental material 
used was a model windmill, the arms of Which were 
otatad at a rate of three revolutions per second. 
When such a model is watched from an angle of about 
25° to the plane of rotation, the arms appear to 
reverse their direction periodically. The first 
observation, Which MoDougall made, was that the rate 
of alternation varied with different subjects in 
conformity with the general rule that introverts 
experienced rapid alternations, extroverts slow ones. 
The/ 
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The eacond observation was that the rapidity of 
alternation could be altered for any given subject 
by the exhibition of either stimulant or depressant 
drugs:- stimulant drugs producing an increase, de-
pressant drugs a decrease of rapidity. Subsequently 
McDougall interpreted this in the sensa that these 
drugs altered the position of the subject on the 
introvert _ extrovert ·scala, the depressants, inclucL 
ing alcohol, favouring extroversion, the stimula,nts 
favouring introversion. The special susceptibility 
of extroverted parsons to axtrovarting drugs .and of 
introverted persons to introverting drugs was a 
necessary corollary. These conclusions ware than 
related to the findings of tha Committee appointed by 
the Liquor Control Board during the recant war to 
investigate the affects o:f alcohol:- findings Which 
McDougall interpreted as showing that alcohol favours 
dissociation. The susceptibility of the extrovert to 
alcohol was thus further evidence of the liability 
of the extrovert to dissociation. The inference that 
the introvert, on the other hand, was specially 
subject to repression was supported by the findings 
of p_sychoanalysts to the affect that repression and 
introversion are constant comp~iona. 
It is in considerations of this nature that 
MoDougall finds support for hie thesis tha.t die_ 
eociation and repression are two distinct, or indeed 
opposed,/ 
18. 
opposed, processes. Both are methods of dealing with 
mental conflict, but they are different methods. 
Dissociation terminates conflict by effecting a aepa 
tion of the conflicting elements, and thus provides a 
solution of conflict, however poor. Repression, .on 
the other hand, merely obscures conflict by preventin 
one set of tendencies from gaining direct expression 
in consciousness (vide Op. cit. p.228). 
Whatever else may be said about McDougall's 
interpretation of dissociation and repression as two 
distinct psychological processes, it is certainly the 
most interesting attempt Which has been made to defin 
their relationship. Examination of the theory, how_ 
ever, reveals many difficUlties in the way of accept-
ing it; an indication of their general nature is all 
that is necessary. Everything depends upo~ ·hie 
ability to preserve the distinction Which he formulat a 
so definitely; yet this is just what ha finds it im_ 
possible to do. Following Janet, he regards hysteria 
as characteristically a product of dissociation. 
Yet it was from the study_of this same disease that 
Freud was led to formulate hie theory of repression. 
If MoDougall finds in hysteria all that is typical o 
dissociation, Freud finds in it all that is typical 
of repression. Further, if MoDougall is righ~ in 
saying that dissociation provides a solution of con_ 
fliot, then it would seem that hysteria is the last 




for in no functional disease are the symptoms mora 
changeable or mora easily aggravated. As a matter of 
fact, McDougall is quite unable to preserve intact hi 
distinction between the two processes. He is forced 
openly to admit that "Conflict and repression prepare 
the way for, and may produce, di~eociation". (op. cit 
p.228.) In another place, referring to a case of 
traumatic hysteria, ha eaya:-
"In cases such as case 3, Where recovery from some 
simple dissociative disability is slow and gradua , 
or long postponed, we have to believe, I think, 
that the continuance of the dissociation is 
favoured by an active repression" (Op. cit. p.238). 
He even goes eo far aa to say:_ 
"It is possible, although in my opinion the evi_ 
dance does not warrant this view, that no die_ 
sociation takes place without soma previous re_ 
preeaion that prepares the way for itff (Op. cit. 
p. 238 ). 
These admissions seam to render meaningless the dis-
tinction which ha takes such pains to establish. 
If the two processes of dissociation and repression 
are eo intimately connected and interact eo constantl , 
McDougall'e differentiation seems to be theoreticall 
unjustifiable and is contradicted even by many of hi 
own clinical observations. 
Thaf., 
20. 
The unsatisfa.ctory nature of the theories of 
Rivers and McDougall regarding the relations4ip of 
dissociation and repression has lad the writer of thi 
thesis to seek a solution of the problem in another 
direction. In spite of the failure of the two theori e 
which have bean examined, they have served a useful 
purpose in clearing the ground and in indicating by 
their very failure the lines along Which a solution 
may be sought. Rivers regarded dissociation as a 
state Which might result from repression. To distort 
hie view slightly, one might almost say that ha re_ 
gardad dissociation as a spacial form of repression. 
McDougall, on the other hand, suggests that they are 
wholly distinct processes. The moat obvious remainin 
alternatives are either:- (a) that the two processes 
are identical, or {b) that repression is a special 
form of dissociation. The former of these alterna_ 
tivea :- viz. that .the two processes are identical:-
is rightly rejected by MoDougall (Op. cit. p.234). 
The impossibility of accepting it will be evident 
when we come to discuss the various phenomena in 
which the process of dissociation manifests itself. 
These include sleep, the hypnotic state and states 
produced by alcohol and fatigue - conditions Which 
can hardly be said to provide evidence of_ repression, 
unless indeed, following Rivers, wa equate reprassio 
and inhibition. That we cannot follow Rivers, how_ 
ever,/ 
21. 
however, in identifying repression and inhibition wil 
be shown when we compare Rivers' theory of repression 
with that of Freud. For the present, it will suffice 
to say that we cannot follow him because one of the 
moat obvious features of these states is the relaxa_ 
tion of repreesi~n. It is in a man's dreams, in hie 
cups and in fatigue that repressed tendencies are moe 
ordinarily released. 
If than it is impossible to regard dissociation 
and repression as identical processes, the alternativ 
remains that repression is a spacial form of dissocia 
tion. That this is the case will be the main con_ 
elusion of this thesis. 
Before we are in a position to draw this con_ 
elusion, however, it is necessary to consider the 
nature of each of theee processes separately in some 
detail. Until this is done, it is impossible to sea 
in what way repression can be regarded as a spacial 
form of dissociation. The necessity for this task 
arises from the fact that the two conceptions ware 
formulated largely in relation to the needs of 
clinical medicine. They were framed primarily to 
promote the understanding and explanation of symptom 
met with in clinical work. Whether these conception 
were compati-ble with the general principles of' menta 
process recognised by psychology was a purely sacon 
consideration. This is particularly true in the 
of the idea of repression. After all, Janet, to 
we owe the theory of dissociation, was a psychologis 
as/ 
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as well as a medical man; and, although he worked 
with a psychology which is obsolete, hie ideas can 
readily be expressed in mo"re modern form. On the 
other hand, Fraud, to whom we owe the theory of' re_ 
pression, regarded general psychology with indiff'er_ 
enca, if' not with contempt. Consequently his psycho-
analytical theory has been developed in complete 
independence .of' psychological ideas, and it has bean 
formulated in highly metaphorical and anthropomorphic 
terms. Of' this the idea of "The Censorship" is a good 
example. The close connection of such a metaphorical 
concept as "The Caneorehiptt with Freud's theory of' 
repression illustrates the need to determine What the 
exact psychological nature of' the latter process is. 
This need is intensified by the fact that, when Freud 
introduced hie theory of repression, he made no attam t 
to relata it to Janat's theory of dissociation, al_ 
though this was already on the field. 
In What follows it is proposed to devote attan_ 
tion first to the process of' dissociation, than to th 
process of repression; finally, When the nature of' 
each has been discussed, it will be possible to con_ 
eider their relationship to one another, and to show 
hOW the present writer comae to regard repression as 
a spacial form of' dissociation. 
23. 
DISSOCIATION. 
The term "Dissociation" is ordinarily applied 
by both medical and peychologica~ writers to cases 
in Which elements of mental life, which are ordinaril 
conaciou~, become split off from the main body of 
conacioueneas and maintain a high degree of independ-
ence. The dissociated elements have been described 
by some wri tare as parte of the mental content (a. g. , 
"ideas", "memories", ate.), by others as aspects of. 
mental functioning (e.g. "tendencies", "habits", 
"emotions", ate.). Others again, preferring phyaio_ 
logical to psychological terms have described the 
dissociated elements in terms of systems of neurone. 
Whatever f9rm the descriptions take, however, the 
tmportant fact remains that the dissociated elements 
seam to exist or function independently of the 
personal conaciousneaa. It is this cutting-off of 
mental elements from the personal consciouaneaa Which 
constitutes the essential feature of dissociation. 
The conception of dissociation was first formu_ 
latad by Pierre Janat, who was Professor of Peycholog 
\ 
in the Collage de France, and Director of the Psycho-
1\ \ 
logical Laboratory in the Clinique of' the Salpetri·ere. 
Janet combined a considerable psychological acumen 
with eminence as a neurologist, and he holds gn 
important/ 
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important plac.a in the modern movement to bring psych _ 
logy into relationship with medicine. This movement, 
Which began to be effective towards the close of the 
19th century, is proving of incalculable adv~.ntage to 
both sciences; and Janat is one of the leading figure 
in the history of this important development. 
T.he hypothesis that mental elements may exist 
outside the limits of ordinary consciousness was not 
a new one. As Dr Bernard Hart points out (British 
Journal of Medical Psychology Vol.VI. Pt. 4. 
ffThe Conception of' Dissociation"), this hypothesis 
may be :found in one form or ano thar in the wri tinge 
of various modern philosophers, before the day When 
psychology differentiated itself from philosophy as 
an independent study. One form which this hypothesis 
took was to the affect that, outside ordinary con_ 
sciousnaas, lay elements of' a like nature to those 
which are conscious but differing from them in in_ 
tansity. These elements ware conceived as being of 
such a low degree of intensity that they escaped 
awareness. The ffpatitaa perceptions" of the phil-
osopher Laibniz ware of this nature. (Leibniz -
"New Essays on the Human Understanding"~ Latta's 
translation, Clarandon Prase, p. 371) Such elements 
correspond to what psychologists in later times have 
described as "The fringe" of coneciouaneas (Prof. 
William Jamee - "Principles of Psychology" 1891, 
Vol. I, p. 958 ). 
we/ 
In accordance with this conception 
we may imagine a field of consciouane·aa analogous to 
the field of vision. Items Which occupy the centra 
of the field are in the focus of attention and are 
vividly conscious, but, aa we pass outwards from the 
centre of the field, we encounter items Which are pro 
greaaively leas and leas characterised by awareness. 
Ultimately we come to items of Which awareness is 
minimal, and, if we pass beyond these, we leave the 
field of consciousness altogether. In the case of 
the field of vision many images, Which fall on the 
periphery of the field, ordinarily escape notice; 
but that we are not altogether unaware of such images 
is ~hewn by the fact that change or movement or the 
appearance of soma unusual character in the image 
at once attracts attention, and there is a tendency 
for the aye to move in such a direction that the 
image may fall on the fovea. Simil~rly the sensa_ 
tiona derived from the pressure of our habitual 
garments upon the body are not ordinarily attended 
to; but, if our collar comes off the stud, we at 
once notice the absence of the usual pressure sensa_ 
tions; we cannot, therefore, have been wholly un_ 
aware of the tactual sensations which the collar 
previously produced. Such phenomena are perfectly 
familiar, and the conception of mental ·elements 
characterised by a minimum of coneciousnase has a 
recognised place in psychology. The conception of 
extra-conscious/ 
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extra-conscious mental elements in this sense, how_ 
aver, is quite different from the conception of extra 
conscious elements involved in the process of die_ 
sociation. The mental elements involved in this 
latter conception are elements of which there is no 
personal awareness at all (not even minimal awareness). 
To .those Who, following Janet, recognise a 
psychological process of dissociation, the dissociate 
elements do not cease to be mental because they have 
no place in consciousness. To philosophers and 
psychologists of the older school who regard "mental" 
and "conscious" as synonymous terms, the conception 
of dissociation can, of course, only be accepted on 
the hypothesis that the dissociated elements maintai 
an independent coneciouaneee of their own outside the 
main, personal conecioueneee. Whether this be eo o 
not, the conception of dissociation remains, eo far 
as ita essential nature is concerned, relatively 
unaffected. There are certain medical writers and 
certain schools of physiological psychologists, of 
whom the American Behaviourists are the most notable, 
who reject the theory of extra_conecious mental 
processes in this sense altogether. such authoritie 
prefer to substitute a purely physiological theory 
of dissociation, explaining the phenomena concerned 
purely in terms of synaptic resistancee and inhibiti n. 
There does not, however, seem any reason, to deny 
the/ 
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the existence of dissociated mental elements because 
there are dissociated paths in the nervous system. 
After all, the relationship between body and mind is 
intimate, and one would expect a certain analogy to 
exist between mental processes and the physiological 
processes to which they are related. Further, if 
extra-conscious mental prooes.aes are excluded from 
the purview of' physiology this holds equally true of 
conac~ous processes. Indeed the Behaviourist school 
are logical enough to recognise this fact, and make 
an attempt to describe human behaviour without any 
reference to mental states at all. The task of' 
physiology, of course, is to interpret the physical 
aspects. of' lif'e in terms of phyeica.l conceptions; 
but, if' any attempt is to be made to interpret the 
mental aspects of' lif'e, it is legitimate to introduce 
those psychological conceptions, which the mental 
f'aots to be explained appear to demand. The psycho-
logical conception of' dissociation is of this nature. 
The hypothesis that there exist mental proceese 
quite outside the personal consciousness, and which 
are not merely processes eXhibiting a weak or minima 
degree of' consciousness, seams to be implied in the 
philosophy of' the XVIIIth Century philosopher Immanu 
Kant ( "Ori tique of' Pure Reason", 1781 ). A definite 
conception of' "Unconscious tt mental states f'inda a 
prominent place in the philosophy of' Schopenhauer 
("The/ 
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("The World as Will and as Idea", 1819), and about th 
same time it is given a definitely psychological 
setting by Herbart ("Text-book of Psychology", 1818). 
These proceeeee are conceived aa different in char_ 
aoter from those occurring ·in coneciouenees, but are 
regarded as capable of influencing and modifying the 
co~soioue procaesee themselves. It wae to explain 
certain phenomena of conscious life that the exietenc 
of these unconscious processes was inferred. It 
appears to be through the medium of von Hartmann that 
the conception of unconscious mental processes was 
kept alive until modern times. The importance of 
von Ha.rtme.nn ( 1842-1908) lies chiefly in the influenc 
which hie wri tinge exercised upon Freud in the formu.. 
lation of hie well-known theory of the Unconscious. 
That the time was ripe for a conception of extra_ 
conscious processes is evident from the fact that, 
in the latter half of' the XIXth Century, Edward 
tt 
Carpenter, Hoff'ding, F.W.H. Myare, Willie.m Jamae and 
Janet, as wall as Freud, all began to turn their 
attention to the consideration of' "unconscious" or 
"sub-conscious" processes. Of the wri tare mentioned, 
Myars, Jamea, Jane~ and Freud ware all led to the 
hypothesis of extra-conscious mental states through 
the consideration of abnormal phenomena. Myers was 
led to this hypothesis through the study of the 
phenomena of spiritualism, Jamae through the study 
of/ 
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of unusual religious expar:t.enc.as, Janat and F'raud 
through the study of hysteria. 
The clinical interest in the phenomena of hyster a, 
which directed the attention of both Janet and Freud 
to the existence of mental processes outside personal 
consciousness, was largely due to the inspiration of 
their teacher Charcot. The debt Which these writers 
owe to Charcot's clinical teaching at the Salp~triere 
has bean· explicitly acknowledged by both. Janat, 
however, does not seem to have been subject to the 
philosophical influences Which affected the course of 
Fraud's thought. The dual influence of philosophy 
and olinioal experience upon Fraud's views may be 
gathered from his paper on ttTha Unconsoioustt publishe 
in 19ln (vide "Col·le·cted Papers~, Vol. IV No. e. ) 
speaking of the· justification of the conception of 
the unconscious, ha aays:-
ffin many quarters our justification is disputed fo 
assuming the existence of an unconscious system 
in the mind and for employing such an assumption. 
for purposes of scientific work. To this wa 
oan reply that our assumption of the existence 
of the unconscious is necessary and legitimate, 
and that we possess manifold proofs of the exist-
ence of the unconscious. It is necessary becaue 
the data of consciousness are exceedingly de-
fective; both in healthy and in sick persona 
mental/ 
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mental acta are often in process which can be 
explained only by presupposing other acts, of 
which conecioueneee yields no evidence. These 
include not only the parapraxes and dreams of 
healthy persona, and everything designated a 
mental symptom or an o9eeeeion in the sick; ·our 
moat intimate daily experience introduces us to 
sudden ideas of the source of Which we are ignora t, 
and to reeul ts of' mentation arrived at .. we know 
not how. All these conscious acts remain die_ 
connected and unintelligible if we are determine 
to hold fast to the claim that every single 
mental act performed within ue must be coneciouel 
experienced; on the other hand, they fall into a 
demonetraole connection if we interpolate the 
unconscious acta that we infer." (Pp. 98, 99). 
It ie thus evident that Freud's conception of 
the unconscious ie not a mare generalisation ba.eed o 
observed clinical :ra.cte. It ie a. hypothesis on a 
grand scala, postulated in order to explain these 
facta. Ae Dr Bernard Hart points out ("Psycho-
pathology", 1927, PP. 44 & n9f. ), this hypothesis 
differs from a generalisation, just ae Newton's 
hypothesis of gravitation differed from Kepler'e 
generalisation that planets move i~ ellipses round.· 
the sun. It ie here that we see the influence of' 
the philosophies of' Schopenhauer and von Hartmann 
upon/ 
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upon Freud's thought. Although it was clinical 
interest that ·directed Freud's attention to the 
phenomena Which led him to frame the hypothesis, he 
formulated it as a general law of the human mind. 
Like Freud, Janet wae led to formulate hie con_ 
caption of dissociation from a -consideration of the 
clinical facta of hysteria and allied conditione, 
but hie conception wae of the natura of a generaliea_ 
tion rather than a hypothesis strictly speaking. 
From hie observation of what he calls ''The accidents 
of' hysteria", such. as anaeetheeiaa, pe,ralyeee and 
amnasiae, he came to the conclusion that in all cases 
there was a narrowing of conecioueneee. He did not 
formulate a general law of .the mind, but contented 
himself with making a generalisation about a limited 
class of facta, which came under hie notice in 
clinical work. This he fra.nkly admi te in the chapte 
anti tled ''L 'Hyet~rie au point de vue peychologique" 
I 
in hie work "L'Etat Mental des Hyeteriquea". Hie 
observations ehewad him that certain functions, 
memories or ideas, Which are present in the normal 
person, are absent in the hysteric, and that conecio 
neee ie thereby impoverished. From this he conclude 
that these elements are out off from ooneoiousneee. 
Further, ha noted that, though these functions, 
memories and ideas have escaped from ooneciouenese, 
they do not oeaee to give evidence of their activity. 
He/ 
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Ha thara~ora inferred that they persist in the mind 
in independence of the main body of conecioueneee, an 
called them "aub-conaciotie". 
The claaa of fact Which led Janet to formulate 
hie conception of dissociation is too wall known to 
require more than a brief' description. An example is 
the freedom from accidental injury Which a hyaterioal y 
anaesthetic limb enjoys. This phenomenon stands in 
striking contrast to what occurs when the anaesthesia 
is of organic origin. Janet's inference was that 
the sensations ware not abolished but only cut off 
from personal consciousness. The "Yea or No" phan_ 
omenon, also found in caaae of hysterical anaesthesia 
received a similar interpretation. To elicit this 
phenomenon the patient is blind-folded and told to 
say ••yea•• when ha is touched on a normal limb, "No" 
when ha is touched on an anaesthetic limb. It is 
frequently found that such a patient responde as 
appropriately to a touch on one limb as to a touch on 
the other. T.hie indicates that sensation from the 
anaesthetic limb is not altogether absent from the 
mind, although it is absent from consciousness. 
similarly, a hysterically blind patient is usually 
able to avoid obstacles placed in hie path. In oases 
of hysterical paralyses, the power to move the 
paralysed limb by voluntary effort is lost, but ita 
position changes in a manner impossible f'or a limb 
affected/ 
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af'f'eoted by organic paralysis. If' the patient f'e,lla, 
the paralysed limb may be used in such a way as to 
sa.va the patient from injury. In hysterical paralysi 
the appearance presented is thus what one would axpec 
if' the power to move the limb remained and the patien 
had forgotten how to move it. Further, it is found 
that lost powers of' sensation and movement may be 
regained under hypnosis, the inference being that 
these powers have never bean properly lost but only 
cut of'f' from ordinary conaoiouanaaa. The amneaiae 
of' hysteria are likewise recoverable under hypnosis: 
and, although a hysteric may have an amnesia f'or a 
certain group of' facta, hie actions are often in_ 
f'luencad by these facta in the absence of' conscious 
knowledge. 
In all such phenomena as these Janet concluded 
that the mental procea~·ea concerned were not aboliahe 
but only cut off' or dissociated. Somnambulisme and 
rugues were likewise explained as the result of die_ 
aooiation; here, however, the dissociation is on a 
vaatar scale. When simple amnesia occurs, there is 
no Wholesale impairment of' the continuity of' personal 
consciousness; in somnambuliama and fugues, on the 
other hand, the continuity of consciousness seams to 
be cut across abruptly and a new conscioueneaa, 
apparently having nothing in common with the normal 
conaciouenaaa, is substituted f'or a period. At the 
end/ 
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end o·f ·this period the old consciousness re_emergee 
ae suddenly as it disappeared, and the temporary 
consciousness vanishes. Similarly, in the hypnotic 
trance the normal state of consciousness ia replaced 
by an artificial state. in which forgotten memories, 
inaccessible to normal consciousness, may be revived. 
When the normal state is restored, on the other hand, 
any events Which took place in tha hypnotic trance 
are immediately forgotten, unless the hypnotiser has 
given an injunction to the affect that they eho~nd 
be remembered. The phenomena of hypnotism were thus 
classed by Janet with somnabulisms, fugues and other 
symptoms of hysteria. All ware explained as illustra 
tions of the same process of dissociation, whereby 
certain mental elements are cut off from the personal 
consciousness without thereby ceasing to have a place 
in the mind. 
It 1e not altogether clear from Janet'e writings 
whether or not he regards the mental elements, Which 
have suffered dissociation, as maintaining an in_ 
dependent consciousness of their own apart from the 
consciousness_ of the main personality. The word 
ffsub-conscious", Which Janet uses to describe such 
dissociated elements, implies on the face of it that 
they do not possess the characteristic quality of 
consciousness. There are passages also in which he 
speaks of the dissociated elements as if this were 
his/ 
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his real view. such a passage may be found on p.6R 
I 
in hie work entitled "L'Etat Mental des Hyeteriquee" 
(Paris, 1911), Where he saya:-
"sans insister sur cas questions purement paychol-
ogiquea, je me contente de faire remarquer que le 
etudes sur quelquee formes particuli~rea d'anee_ 
I I 
thesie, et en particulier l'etude du champ visual 
I I 
sont venues confirmer notre conclusion generals. 
A 
Dane tous lea cas, mama dane le dernier, lee 
sensations n'ont pas disparu abeolument, ellee 
sont eimplement devenuee eubconscientee parce 
qu'ellee sont sorties du champ de la conscience." 
From this passage there can, of course, be no doubt 
that Janet regards the missing sensory elements in 
hysterical anaesthesia as preserved in the mental 
sphere; i.e. hie theory is one of psychological not 
of physiological dissociation. This must be his 
meaning When he says that the sensations have not 
disappeared absolutely but have simply become sub_ 
conscious. If the eeneatione, however, have not 
disappeared, the question arises Whether they have 
preserved an independent consciousness of their own. 
From this passage taken at face value, it would appea 
that they are regarded aa being properly unconscious: 
"They have left the field of consciousness." The 
passage quoted, however, proceeds in a fasnion Which 
modifies/ 
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modifies this interpretation of Janet'a meaning. 
It proceeds thus:-
"Le r~traciaaement du champ visual paut ~tra con_ 
aider~ comma l'embl~me de la senaibilit~ hyst~riq e, 
I f 
en general. La perception peraonnelle, la con_ 
1\ science que noua avona nous-memea des faits de 
conscience eat moins large; elles ne parvient plu 
' I I a reunir la quantite normale des faits ordinaire_ 
ment per~us." 
These ~th~r sentences indicate that Janet is using 
the word "conaciousnesatt in two senses:- (a) as the 
quality of consciousness in general, (b) ae the per_ 
sonal consciousness. It would appear that he ie 
using it in the latter sense When he says that "the 
sensations have become sub-conscious simply because 
they have left_ the field of consciousness''. If this 
be so, it follows that in speaking of' 9•aub-conecioua" 
sensations Janet merely means sub-conscious in re_ 
lation to the main personal consciousness. He does 
not mean to imply that the sub-conscious elements hav 
not some consciousness of their own. Indeed, the 
general tenor of hie views aeema to suggest that an 
independent consciousness is maintained by the dis-
sociated elements. While it is difficult to find a 
passage in which Janet states this view explicitly, 
it is certainly the logical inference of hie con_ 
caption of dissociation. This, at any rate, is how 
nr/ 
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nr Bernard Hart interprets him, in his article 
"The conception of the Unconscious" in the British 
Jo~l of Medical Psychology Vol. VI. (p.248). 
Contrasting Janet'a "sub-conscious" with Freud's 
"Unconscious", he expresses the opinion that the 
divisions of the mind included under dissociation are 
divisions of consciousness. 
ttJanet' a 'sub-conscious'," he says ttcomprises thoa 
instances of dissociation where the lack of 
integration is such that there is a lack of mutua 
awareness between two streams, but in every other 
respect the processes concerned have all the 
attributes of consciousness. The division of 
dissociation is, therefore, a division within 
consciousness." 
The present writer has been unable to find an ex_ 
plicit statement by Janet to this effect, but at any 
rate it is the logical outoome of the conception of 
dissociation as he framed it. 
What Janet leaves to be inferred from his views 
has been explicitly formulated by other writers, Who 
have derived their inspiration from Janet's wor·k. 
Among these may be mentioned Professor Morton Prince, 
who is perhaps the moat notable of those who have 
applied the idea of dissociation to the explanation o 
abnormal mental states. Moat of his attention was 
devoted to the study of cases of multiple personality 
whioh/ 
which ha explained as due to a dissociation of con_ 
aciouenaee. These caeae, of course, land thamealvee 
mora easily than any other phenomena known to psycho-
pathology to an interpretation basad on the division 
of' coneciouenaee. This ie evident in the case of' 
Mise B. whose mental state ie studied in Morton Princ 'a 
work "The Dissociation of' a Pareonali ty". Mise B. 'a 
lif'e history was characterised by periods in which 
her normal personality appeared to be ra~lacad by the 
totally dif~arent personality of' "sally". The two 
personalities had mental charaotarietice as dif'f'arant 
as any two individuals, and they had a separate set 
of' memories. Mise B. was not aware of' Sally's exist-
. ance, but Sally was aware of' Mise B. as an external 
personality. .Cases of' this nature led Morton Prince 
to f'ormulata the view that the individual pereonali ty 
was capable, under conditione which f'avourad die_ 
aociation, of' being split up into two or more eeparat 
entities, each of' Which had a conaciouaneee o~ ita 
own. T.he evidence led him to the conclusion that, 
when one of' these personalities occupied the stage, 
the other personalities or personality persisted in a 
state Which was none the lees conscious because dis-
sociated. To this state he gave the name of' "eo_ 
conscious". Where the dissociation involved elements 
too f'aw to constitute a separate personality ha 
believed that there resulted such phenomena ae the 
anaeethaeiaa,/ 
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anaasthesiae, paralyses, amnesiae etc., to Which 
Janet had called attention; in all cases, however, 
the dissociated elema~ts have, in hie view, a detache 
consciouanesa o:f their ow:n,and they are described as 
co-conscious. Accordingly, he divided those phenomen , 
which appear to influence behaviour without appearing 
in the personal consciousness, into two g·roups :-
1. The unconscious, Which consists in neurological 
dispositions and processes, 2. The co-conscious, whic 
consists in dissociated mental elements, Which, While 
outside personal awareness, are yet characterised by 
a consciousness of their own. (Ref. Morton Prince, 
"The Unconscious", 1910, Preface p.X.) The Co_coneci us 
he regarded as identical with Janet'e "sub-conscious" 
(op. cit. p.2n2). 
Rivers adopts an essentially similar view re_ 
garding dissociated mental elements. Taking the fugu 
as the moat characteristic product of dissociation, 
he concludes that the existence of an independent 
conecioueneee is the moat characteristic feature of 
dissociation. ("Instinct and the Unconscious" p. 7A) 
Rivers, however, differs from Morton Prince in that 
he recognises the existence of' mental elements which, 
while inaccessible to the per~onal coneciouenaes, are 
yet unaccompanied by a consciousness of their own. 
such elements, as already indicated, ha deecri bee as· 
"suppressed experience", and in this oategory he 
includes/ 
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includes many of the phenomena Which wouid be des_ 
cribed by Janet ea "eub_conecioue", and by Morton 
Prince "co_conecioue". "Suppression", e.e he conceive 
it, ie a wider concept than "dissociation", which, 
for him, amounts to a spacial form of suppression. 
It is that form of suppression in Whioh the suppresse 
elements retain a consciousness o~ their own. 
Rivers' view of dissociation raises the question 
whether the existence of independent consciousness 
in the dissociated elements is a satisfactory criteri n 
for differentiating dissociation from other mental 
processes. McDougal~, discussing dissociation in 
his "Outline of Abllormal Psychology", disputes the 
advisability of adopting _this criterion. Not that 
McDougall denies the fact that such an independent 
consciousness may exist: On the-oontrary, in die_ 
cusaing automatisma, such as fugues, eomnambulisma 
and hysterical fits, in Chap. XII, he brings forward 
considerations which, to use his words, "point 
strongly to the view that in all automatic actions 
we have to do with expressions of a subsidiary stream 
of conscious mental activity, Which we may beat des-
cribe by the term 'co_conscioua activity', following 
nr Morton Prince." (Op. cit. p.2nn.) McDougall 
believes, however, that the existence of co_conscious 
activity is not an essential or necessa.ry feature of' 
dissociation. Accordingly, in the following passage 
he protests against the use of the phrase "diaeociati n 
of/ 
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of ooneciouenees", and suggests "dissociation of the 
pereoJ?Ali ty" a a a substitute.:_ 
"Many author! ti'es write of 'diesocia tion of con_ , 
acioueneea'; Janet has used more frequently the 
expression 'disaggregation of consciousness'. 
This_way of speaking is, it seems to me, un_ 
fortun~te; for it begs two of the great questions 
raised by the phenomena: first it implies the 
questionable assumption that consciousness is an 
aggregation, that the stream of normal thinking 
is, somehow, compounded of elements of conscious_ 
ness capable of' independent or separate existence; 
in short, it assumes the truth of some form of 
the atomietic psychology. Secondly, it implies 
~hat, in the dissociated state, elements of 
consciousness that should have become aggregated 
in the main stream have some sort of' existence 
.or subsistence in a collateral stream; and this 
also is a disputable assumption. It is better, 
therefore, to speak of dissociation of the 
personality." (Ref. Op. cit. p.234. ). 
McDougall'e contention appears to be well-founded. 
One cannot help feeling that to seek the differentia 
of dissociation in the presence of independent 
coneciousneee is to pursue wrong linea. What ie 
distinctive about the dissociated elements is not 
independent/ 
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independent consciousness but independent activity. 
That consciousness may accompany this activity is 
theoretically possible, and the facts of certain con~ 
ditions, such as multiple personality, indicate that 
this may sometimes be the case. This, however, is 
mainly a matter of theoretic interest, and leaves on 
one aide the essentia.l problems of disaociati.on in 
· their more important and practical bearing. It is 
without doubt this fact Which explains the absence 
from Janet's writings of explicit statements regardin 
the presence or otherwise of an independent conscious 
neas accompanying dissociated states. Janet'e atten_ 
tion was focuaeed upon the essential features of die_ 
aociation, and he did not find the presence of an 
independent consciousness in the dissociated elements 
to be one of them. Hence the problem involved did 
not attract his explicit attention. Co-conaciouanesa 
is implied in hie view, but that is all. 
It is to another feature of the process of die_ 
aociation that Janet looks for ita essential nature. 
This feature is independence of activity as against 
independence of consciousness. This is perhaps due 
to the fact that it was the study of the ordinary 
symptoms of hysteria rather than of the fugue and 
the multiple personality that led him to the idea of 
dissociation. 
University/ 
In one of his lectures at Harvard 
University' in the autumn of 1908, ha summarises hie 
view of hysteria as follows:-
''Hyetaria is a form of mental depression character 
izad by a .retraction of the field of personal 
conaciouenaee and a tendency to the dissociation 
and emancipation of the systems and functions tha 
coneti tuta pareonali ty." (Raf. "The Major Sympto e 
of Hysteria", 1907, p. 332). 
In this definition Janet singles out two processes as 
constituting the essential features of hyeteria:-
1. Retraction of the field of personal conecioueneae, 
2. A tendency to dissociation and emancipation of the 
eyatame and functions that constitute personality. 
These two processes are, however, merely two aspects 
of one and the same process. This single process is, 
properly speaking, the process of dissociation itsal 
It is a process Whereby certain mental elements or 
~ctione are excluded from personal consciousness, 
and this inevita.bly i!lvolvae a narrowing of the 
conscious field. Whether the excl-uded elements or 
~otione themselves may retain a certain conscious_ 
neee of their own, and, if eo, Whether they invariabl 
do eo are questions about which we need not concern 
ourselves unduly. These are secondary consideration 
which do not affect the fundamental natura of die~ 
eociation itself. 
It seams desirable, therefore, to look for the 
characteristic/ 
44. 
characteristic feature of dissociation where Janet 
found it:- in the exclusion or cutting off of certai 
mental elements from the field of personal conscious_ 
ness, which ie thereby.narrowed. This may also be 
expressed by saying that it is a narrowing of the 
conscious field Whereby certain mental elements are 
cut off; but it is the cutting off that is the ·char_ 
acterietic feature. 
The value of Janet'a conception of dissociation 
as a process Whereby mental elements are cut off from 
personal coneciouaneae has been widely recognised by 
psychologists, and indeed may now be said to have 
:round a place in orthodox psychology. There are, 
however, certain features of Janat's formulation, 
which, although they may escape the notice o:f medical 
clinicians, yet prove unacceptable to mos_t psycholog1 te. 
Fortunately, they do not affect the conception in ita 
essential nature; but, if inconsistency between.med-
ioal and psychological ideas is to be avoided, it is 
essential that they should be recognised. 
The chief weakness of Janet'e formulation, which 
are two in number, have been admirably pointed out by 
Bernard Hart in the article already quoted {"The 
Conception of Dissociation", Bri tieh Journal of' 
Medical Psychology, Vol.VI. p.242f'. ). The moat im_ 
portant of these weaknesses is dependent on the fact 
that Janet set out with a peyohology which is now 
recognised/ 
recognised on all hands to be misleading. This is 
the eo-called "·Associationist Psychology", Which trac s 
its ancestry to the philosophers Locke, Berkeley and 
Hume, and Which dominated psychological thought in 
France and Britain until the opening of the present 
century. Indeed, although it is now discountenanced, 
ita influence is not even yet dead. According to the 
Associationist Schoo·l, the content of' the mind is 
made up of' a number of separate items or ideas, which 
are compounded together to form more complex products 
but which are in themselves simple and indivisible. 
This atomistic conception of mind-stuf~ is untrue to 
the facta of' the mind, just as an analogous idea 
would be untrue of the physical organism. The organ1 m 
fUnctions as a whole, and~ while various aspects of 
its functioning may be distinguished and separately 
described, the organism does not consist in a col_ 
leotion of separate functions, one of which may be 
aubtr~cted without vitally affecting all the others. 
Thus it is inconceivable that the bile-secreting 
:f'unction of' the liver should be "dissociated" from 
the rest of ita functions, leaving the liver's 
activity unaffected except for the loss of this one 
~ction. Similarly, the mind does not consist in 
an aggregation o~ separate elements or functions, on 
of which can be split off from the rest without any 
effect except its loss. Yet this is the atomistic 
conception of the mind which Janet accepted from the 
Aaaociationists,/ 
48. 
Asaociationiste, and it introduces a weakness into 
hie formulation-of the process of dissociation. 
The other great weakness of Janet's formulation w e 
due to hie enslavement to the spatial metaphor. He 
modelled his c9nception of the field of consciousness 
upon the field of vision, which has a spatial refer-
ence. He obserVed in hysterics a conoentric narrowin 
of the visual field, Which resulted in the exclusion 
of peripheral images from conscious perception (Vide 
"The Major Symptoms of Hysteria", p. 197). Yet one of 
hie patients with a visual field of n° could be re_ 
duced to a paroxysm of terror, if the image of a 
lighted match fell on the peripheral field (p.198). 
such cases lad him to assume a dissociation of the 
pariphera.l field of vision. Janet ascribed to 
consciousness in general a field basad on the analogy 
I f 
of' the visual field:.- "Le Retreciseement du champ 
1\ r I \ 
visual paut etre conaidere comma l'emblema de la 
/ I I I 
sensibilite hyeterique, en general." (L'Etat Mental 
I 
dae Hyetariquea, p.87). Ha thus described die_ 
eoc1at1on in general ae if it involved a cutting off 
of part of a spatial field. This is a useful metapho , 
but, since the mind is not in apace, the metaphor, if 
pressed too far, leads to an over-simplification of 
facta too compl~ to be expressed eo simply. Janat 
ia not the only medical psychologist Who has bean 
misled by applying the epatia.l metaphor too rigidly 
to/ 
to mental processes. Freud has committed the same 
mistake. Hie original division of' the mind into the 
Conscious, the Pre-conscious and the Unconscious, and 
his later division of' it into the Ego, the Id and the 
Super-ago are both conceived too much in spatial term , 
and this constitutes one of' the chief weakness of 
hie theory, aa.it does of Janet'a. 
Under the influence then, of the Associationiet 
psychology and an enslavement to the spatial metaphor 
Janet conceived dissociation as the separation of a 
mental element or a group of' elements from the main 
aggregation of such elements which he conceived to 
constitute the mind. ·The unsatisfactory nature of' 
this view ia beat realised When we consider such a 
large-scale dissociation aa ia involved in cases of 
multiple personality. In such cases it is often foun 
that certain elements f'ind a place in more than one 
of the dissociated personalities. Sometimes, too, 
the barrier raised by the dissociation ie, eo 
permeable in one direction only. This ia beet seen 
in oases Which eXhibit "Co_conacioua" phenomena. 
we have not merely an alternation of personalities, 
but evidence suggesting a co-existence of' the person_ 
ality which is in abeyance at the moment. Thus in 
the case of Mise B., recorded by Morton Prince, the 
secondary personality Sally was aware of Mise B. 'a 
thoughts and activities as those of another person, 
but/ 
48. 
but Mise B. was totally unaware of the very existence 
of Sally (vide Morton Prince, "The Dissociation of a 
Personality"). Similarly, in·the hypnotic state a 
_patient has access to the memories of the normal atat , 
but no memories of What occurred in a hypnotlc state 
are ac~eaaible to the normal conaciousneaa, unaeaa a 
suggestion is given to that affect. Such phenomena 
are hard to reconcile with Janet'a description of 
dissociation as a process whereby a number of mental 
elements are separated 'en maaae' from the totality 
of the mind. This is pointed out by Bernard Hart in 
hie article on "The Conception of Dissociation" 
(British Journal of Medical Psychology, Vol.VI, p.243). 
A further objection to Janet'a notion of die_ 
aociated mental elements existing in an isolated 
state is raised by Dr T.W. Mitchell ("The Psychology 
of Medicine", 1921, p. 33 ). As Mi tchell points out, 
"Thoughts and feelings cannot be left floating about 
in the void, unclaimed by any thinker''. He adds tha 
"While the patient is awake and aware of some things, 
dissociated sensations or perceptions may provide 
evidence of a concurrent discriminative awareness of 
other things, as effective aa that Which characteriz a 
the sensory or perceptive activity of the conscious 
waking self", (p.34). This fact may be illustrated 
by the "Yea or No" phenomenon of hysteria, to Which 
reference has already been made. This phenomenon 
shows that, although sensations from the anaesthetic 
limb/ 
limb sre not consciously appreciated, the function 
involved is not out off from the structure of the 
mind _ a fact Which is obscured in Janet's formulatio 
of dissociation. In this respect Freud's conception 
of' "Repression" ie more satisfactorily formulated; 
for, altho~, according to Fraud, repressed elements 
are unconscious, he still regards them ae part of 
the structure of' the mind and as capable of' in:f'luenci g 
behaviour. 
Janet's associationiat and spatial preconceptione 
thus impose a profound limitation upon hie conception 
of dissociation, and introduce insuperable difficult-
ies in the application of the conception to many of 
the phenomena which it ought to be able to explain. 
To quote Bernard Hart:-
"Dieeociation does not aepe.rate the mind into 
pieces, it only produces more or leas independ-
ently acting functional unite, each such unit 
comprising material which may be peculiar to 
itself, but which may just aa well form a part 
o:f any number of other :functional uni ta. The 
distinguishing character does not lie in the 
material of which it is composed, but in the eat 
or pattern. Instead of regarding dissociation 
as the splitting of conscious material into 
separate maaeea, it must be regarded as an af:fai 
of gearing, the various elements of mental 
machinery/ 
FiO. 
machinery being organized into different function 1 
systems by the throwing in of the appropriate 
gear". (Article in B.J .M.P. Vol. VI, P. 247). 
The conception of dissociation, which Bernard Hart 
advocates ae a substitute for the spatial conception 
of Janet, is described by him as "The functional con_ 
caption". Interpreted in this sense, the conception 
of dissociation has bean widely accepted by psychol-
ogists, but medical writers too often cling to the 
original spatial formulation. In the interests of 
clarity and conformity to the facta of the mind, it 
is desirable that medical thought should adapt itself 
to the "functional" conception of dissociation. 
Interpreted in the functional sanae, diaaociatio 
is a phenomenon of the mind which is not necessarily 
abnormal. Undoubtedly it is in abnormal mental state 
that the process 1~ seen in ita moat striking form; 
but it may also be observed in perfectly normal 
individuals under certain conditione. The conditione 
under Which dissociation occurs in normal individuals 
seem, therefore, to deserve some consideration, if 
the true nature of dissociation is to be properly 
understood. Attention must consequently be devoted 
to this aspect of the subject, and, for reasons Which 
will appear shortly, the nature of the material die_ 
aociatad will be specially noted. 
Emotion in itself is a perfectly normal phanome n 
of/ 
of the mind, but dissociation appears to be one of it 
invariable accompaniments. Since Professor William 
McDougall first formulated hie theory of Instinct 
("social Psychology", 1908), it has coma. to be recog_ 
nised that when any deeply-rooted innate tendency is , . 
profoundly stirred, a feeling-state is liable to make 
ita appearance. Certain of these innate. tendencies 
have associated with their activity emotions which ar 
quite characteristic _ the instinct of_ pugnacity, for 
example, having associated with it the characteristic 
emotion of anger. When an instinct is powerfully 
appealed to, Nature appears to have provided that 
all other tendencies irrelevant to the situation in 
hand should be inhibited. The importance of this 
arrangement is evident when we consider how much the 
surVival-value of the instinct of escape would be 
compromised, if, in a danger-situation, the activity 
of other ten~enciee ware not temporarily suspended. 
In such a situation, it is of obvious advantage that 
all the activities of the organism should be directed 
to the and of escape, and to that end a.lone. If, 
therefore, the object of the instinct of escape is to 
be attained, it ia of first-class importance that no 
competing tendency, e.g. food-seeking or mating, 
should be allowed any opportunity of expression. 
The emotion which tends to develop, When the tendenc, 
fear;/ 
fear• and its function would seem to be to reinforce 
' 
the tendency with which it is associated by filling 
consciousness to the exclusion of. all else. This 
involves the exclusion from consciousness of all tha 
is not relevant to the situation. There is at once 
narrowing and intensifying of consciousness - exactl 
what Janet showed to occur in the case of hysteria. 
In a word, the development of emotion involves a 
process of dissociation. What holds true of the 
amotion of fear holds true of emotion in general. 
To quote Dr James Drevar:-
"The moat interesting of the psychical effects of 
emotion is probably the narrowing and spacializin 
of consciousness. When under the influence of a 
strong emotion we may become blind and deaf to 
everything which is not relevant to the end 
determined by the emotion; we may forget prinoipl a 
and resolutions; we may even temporarily break 
away from what might be described as character_ 
istically the Whole trend of our life activity. 
In all these cases the psychological process 
known as 'dissociation' is involved, and soma 
kind and degree of emotional dissociation is a 
matter of everyday experience. This is more than 
the mere regulative function of feeling. It is a 
definite blocking of those connecting paths in 
the nervous system _ and in the mind _ which 
normally/ 
normally ensure the due balance and control of ou 
various interests and activities. In extreme cas a 
an individual may lose control of fUndamental 
muscular and sensory mechanisms. Speech may be 
lost, and the control of still ea~lier and more 
primitive functions and co-ordinations may die~ 
appear. Usually this dissociation is merely· 
temporary, and normal conditione are restored ae 
the amotion passes away. occasionally, however, 
more or leas permanent diesociationa may take 
place, when the case becomes distinctly patho-
logical. Numerous instances of such pathological 
dissociation occurred during the war, and in 
their various forma ware all popularly included 
under the designation 'shell-shock'. '1 (Jamee 
· nrever, "The Psychology o:f Everyday Life", 1927, 
p. 3n. ) 
From this statement it is evident that, although the 
development of emotion may raeul t in an abnormal 
degree and extant of dissociation, a tendency to dis-
sociation is a perfectly normal accompaniment of 
amotion. Further, if we consider the nature of the 
elements or functions which tend to be dissociated 
under the influence of amotion, they are seen to be 
those elements or functions which are irrelevant to 
the situation with which the orga.niam is :faced at th 
time. 
The influence o:f amotion in producing diaeocia_ 
tion/ 
dissociation did not escape the notice of Janet. 
Indeed, ha draw particular attention to this phanoman n. 
Thus Chapter VI in Part II .of' hie "L 'Etat Mental dee 
I I 
Hysteriquaa!' is anti tled "L 'Amnesia at la Disaociati n 
des souvenirs par L 'Emotion''. In this chapter he 
\ 
studies the case of' Irene, a young woman of' twenty-
three, who for two years had suffered from a hyeter_ 
ical state characterised chiefly by hallucinatory 
somnambulisms and a profound amnesia. These phenomen 
were traced by Janet to the influence of' intense 
emotions experienced at the death of her mother. 
He concludes that in this; as in other cases Which 
he studied, emotion was responsible for the dis-
sociation Which had developed. Thus, towards the an 
of the chapter in question he says:-
· I I / / 
"Enfin la precedents etude mettait en evidence le 
role consid~rable de 1 1 6motion pour produire cett 
\ dissociation de la synthase menta.le." (Op. ci t. 
P. n32 ). 
The phrase "Dissociation of' mental synthesis" dt'awe 
attention to a feature of' Janat's views to which 
reference will be made later:- the view, namely, 
that dissociation is the result of a failure of' 
1\ 
menta.l synthesis. Janat interprets the role played 
by emotion in producing dissociation in· terms of' thi 
general conception. This is not the pla.ce to cri ti_ 






observation that emotion favours dissocie.tion admits i 
of no dispute. l 
Another group of phenomena, Which Janet attribut s 
I 
::g:::::::.of(::::a:P~~::~o:~~3:~~ ~:f:::::::n:Yof I 
the clinical studies of Charcot and Babinski, he re_ li 
gardad the phenomena of suggestion ae specially 
1 
cha.racteriatic of hysteria. Ha did not go so far as 
Babinski, whom ha quotes as sa.ying "A phenomenon is 
hysterical when it oan be produced through suggestion! 
I 
and cured through persuaaiontt. (Vide Janet, "The 
Major Symptoms of Hysteria.u, p. 32n ). But Janet did 
regard suggestibility as a pathological phenomenon, 
and he cla.ssed it as one of' the great stigmata of' 
hysteria (p.279). He says ttA tendency to suggestion 
and subconscious acta is the sign of mental disease, 
but it ia, above all, the sign of' hysteria", (p. 289); 
and again "I have never seen a finely suggestible 
subject who waa not clearly hysterical'• (p. 290 ). 
This view is undoubtedly an exaggera.tion, although 
there can be no question about the suggestibility of 
hystarical patients. Janet himself admits, albeit 
somewhat grudgingly, that. suggestion may ta.ke place 
with subjects who are not hysterical. In the "Revue 
Phiosophiquett of 1888, ha himself described a case 
.. 
of remarkable suggestibility in a man convalescent 
from acute delirium. He admits that the conditions, 
which/ 
which me.kea suggestion possible, a.riae in various in_ 
factive diseases, in intoxioations and alcoholism,. 
in nervous diseases like neurasthenia. and chorea, and 
also in the case of' imbeciles (L 'Etat Mente.l des 
, 
Hyatariquea, p. 237); but ha ie careful to add:_ 
' "Il faut avouer qu'il y a una mala.die partiouliere 
I 
qui reunit d'une f'a.~on merveilleuae lea deux 
conditione eaaentielles de la auggestion,la 
conservation de l'automatisme et la diminut~on 
\ I I de la synthase personelle: c'est l'etat hysteriqu rt 
It ia impossible at the present time to follow Ja.net 
in the opinion that suggestion is an abnormal phenom-
anon. While it must be admitted that, in certain 
' 
abnormal conditions like hysteria, suggestibility 
assumes a pathological fonn, the psychology of rumour 
proves beyond question that normal individuals are 
·amenable to the influence of suggestion. The fact 
is that suggestion is a phenomenon of dissociation. 
The rea.son that auggesti bili ty was found by Janet to 
be such an important stigma of hysteria lies in the 
fact that hysteria eXhibits disaocia.tion in such a 
marked degree. Dissociation is not, however, necas_ 
earily an abnormal phenomenon. It is only abnormal 
when it gets out o:f hand. We have already seen that 
it is a necessary accompaniment of emotion, and, 
a~though excessive emotionality is pathological, 
emotion/ 
emotion itself' is not. Similarly, suggestion in 
i tsalf is a perfectly normal process due to dissocia._ 
tion; it only becomes pathological i:f dissociation ie 
excessive. 
Suggestion, in the psychological sense,has been 
defined by McDougall ae "A process of' communication 
resulting in the acceptance with conviction of' the 
communicated proposition in the absence of-logically 
adequate grounds for its acceptance,. ("Socia.l Psych_ 
ologytt, 21st Ed.i tion, enlarged, 1921, p. 83 ). 
Rivers regards it as a process corresponding to the 
cognitive aspect of the gregarious instinct (Vide 
ttrnstinct e.nd the Unconscious", 1924, p. 91; but, be 
that as it may, it is essentially a social phenomenon 
involving a personal relationship. 
It is a "Method of exerting personal influence by 
which one individual is brought to accept from 
another a statement, opinion, or belief, and to 
act upon it, without having, or seeking to have, 
adequate logical grounds for its acceptance". 
(Drever, "Psychology of Everyday Life", p. nl). 
nrever goes on to say:-
"The general condition upon which suggestion depen e 
may be beet described by saying that, when any 
idea presents itself in our consciousness, Which 
involves believing or acting in a certain way, 
any factors which prevent opposing ideas rising 
in consciousn~ss will tend to make us believe or 
act/ 
nB. 
act in accordance with the idea presented, e_nd so 
f'ar therefore make us suggestible. The extent to 
which opposing ideas can be prevented from rising 
in consciousness will be a measure of auggesti-
bility. This prevention of the rise of opposing 
ideas is of the nature of dissociation, which we 
1 
have already met with as a characteristic phanom_ 
anon of emotion. Suggestion might therefore be 
described as a means of producing dissociation, 
and suggestibility as the tendency for dissocia_ 
(p. ~2-R3). 
This p~aaage shows with admirable clearness the part 
played by disaocia.tion in the phenomena of suggestion 
it also gives us some insight into the nature of the 
material Which is dissociated when suggestion becomes 
effective. The nature of the dissociated material 
becomes evident from the statement that "the extent 
to which opposing ideas can be prevented from rising 
in consciousness will be a measure of suggestibility"• 
It is "opposing ideas" the.t e.re dissociated in 
suggestion. Every idea that is incompatible with the 
suggested idea is cut off from acceptance and from 
motor expression. In the ca.se of suggestion, there_ 
fore,/ 
therefore, it is incompatibility with the content of 
the suggestion given that determines what ideas and 
tendencies shal.l be dissociated. 
Allied to the dissociation which occurs in sug_ 
gestion is that which occurs in.hypnosis. As we have 
already seen, the Nancy School want so far as to say I 
that the hypnotic state was simply ordinary sleep 
induced by suggestion. This vi~w is certainly an 
over-simplified explana.tion of' a complex phenomenon, 
although, under Bernheim's influence,suggeetion is 
now universally employed to produce hypnosis. 
Whatever be the ruTidamental character of the hypnotic 
state, however, exaggerated suggestibility is certain y 
one of ita moat characteristic features. This being 
eo, we should expect to find evidence of dissociatio1 
in the hypnotic state, and indeed hypnosis furnishes I 
us with perhaps the moat remarkable exa.mple of' a 
dissociated state. It is familiar knowledge the.t 
almost any dissociation of which a human being is 
capable may be produced in a hypnotised person. 
Anaeathasiae, paralyses, rigidity, contractures and 
all the host of phenomena familiar in hysteria may 
be induced or removed at the word of the hypnotist. 




istics so foreign to his normal cha.ra.ctar as to rami d 
us of the phenomena o~ multiple personality. That 
the hypnotic state is characterised by a process of 
dissociation/ 
AO. 
dissociation may also be gathered :from the amnesia, 
which, unless. a suggestion be gi van to the contrary, 
prevents the subject, on the restoration o:f normal 
/ 
consciousness :from recalling the events o:f the seance _ 
an amnesia Which is absolute, unless the hypnotist 
gives a suggestion to the contrary. Here again the 
nature o:f the dissociated material seems to be deter_ 
mined by incompatibility with the suggestions o:f the 
hypnotist. 
T.he similarity o:f the hypnotic state to ordinary 
sleep is witnessed by the name "hypnosis", which, as 
c/ 
is wall known, is derived :from the Greek u~vos 
:for 'sleep'. Whether the Nancy School are right or 
wrong in describing the hypnotic state as one o:f 
sleep induced by suggestion, at any rate ordinary 
sleep furnishes another typical example of dissocia_ 
tion. Whatever be the physiological conditions o:f 
sleep (and o:f these there appears to be no certainty 
among physiologists), in its psychological aspect 
sleep displays all the chare,cteristic :features o:f 
dissociation. As we sink into sleep, there is a 
progressive development o:f functional anaesthesiae, 
paralyses and amnesiae. The functions of sensation, 
perception, thought and memory quit the :field of 
consciousness. Feelings and emotions vanish, and th 
powers o:f voluntary movement desert us. Attention 
lapses, and the :field o:f consciousness becomes pro_ 




progressively narrowed, until it is completely beref'tl 
of content and a state of unconsciousness ensues. l 
All this is typical of dissociation as observed in t~ 
phenomena of' hysteria and hypnosis. As in these con_l 
ditions the dissociated ~ctions are not lost. , 
The sleeper adjusts his position and makes mora or 
less adapted movements such as pushing back the 
clothes if he is too hot. These activities occur, 
however, without the intervention of consciousness. 




\Vi th consciousness; otherwise, it would be imposai ble 
to understand how sounds could awake the sleeper. I 
It is a significant fact, in this connection, that not 
all sounds do awaken the sleeper. He can sleep throu~ 
I 
I 
sounds to whioh he is accustomed, however loud these I 
I 
l 
may be; but even the faintest sound may awaken him 
if it is a sound which would have a marked significa.n~e 
I 
for him in waking life, i.e. if it appeals to a power~ 
:fUl innate or acquired interest. Thus a mot..."'rler _may 
sleep through a thunderstorm and yet ~twakan at the 
faintest sound from her baby. Facts such as these 
show that the various mental functions are not 
abolished in sleep. They e.re merely dissociated. 
In normal sleep the di. ssocia tion is mora massive than 
is usual in hysteria or hypnosis _ although the 
hysterical and the hypnotic trance remind us that 




When sleep is deep, dissociation may be said to be j 
total; but in the lighter degrees o~ sleep diaaociati.n 
is leas extensive _ as is evident ~rom the occurrence 
of dreams. That soma degree o~ dissociation is presen~ 
. i 
even in light sleep may_ be gathered from the ease wi, 
which dreams are ~orgottan. Hare we have another . 
example of amnesia dependent upon dissociation. 
If we proceed to consider the nature of the 
mental elements Which are dissociated in sleep, we 
are faced with a dif~iculty which did not meat us 
in the case of the dissociations produced by emotion, 
suggestion and hypnosis. In the case of emotion we 
find a dissociation of' all those thoughts, interests 
and tendencies, which are irrelevant to the tendency 
activated by the situation with Which the orga.nism is 
faced. In suggestion and hypnosis we find a die_ 
sociation of all that is incompatible with ideas 
present to the subject. In sleep, however, there 
seems to be a dissociation of' all mental content 
Whatsoever. Sleep appears to be primarily determine 
by the need of the organism for rest, and, at first 
sight, it seems a pointless task to try to bring 
the dissociated material under any cle.ssification 
at all. A little consideration, however, show·s that 
the task is not so hopeless. The fact that the need/ 
for rest determines the onset of sleep itself pro_ / 
vides a clue. If we study the behaviour of a person 
seeking sleep, we find that ha withdraws himself eo/ 
63. 
eo far aa possible from all sources of sensory atimu_ 
lation. He seeks a quiet and dark room, lies down 
in a bed Where he is protected from extremes of 
temperature, and, by relaxing hie muscles, renders 
himself as far as possible immune from kinaesthetic 
sensations. He thus takes measures to prevent the 
occurrence of stimuli which fill consciousness with 
content and stir powerful tendencies. He puts him_ 
self under conditions which favour a lapsing of the 
ordinary interests of the day. If, however, the last 
condition is not fU.lfilled, and his mind is occupied 
with thoughts carried over from the day's activities, 
sleep is likely to be deferred, even though the other 
conditions are secured. Normally, however, when the 
need for rest makes itself felt, the interests of the 
day automatically sink into abeyance. This ma.y be 
interpreted as a dissociation of all mental content 
which is incompatible with the innate rest-seeking 
tendency. Another interpretation is, however, pos_ 
sible, when we further consider how naturally-the 
interests of the day lapse when the need for sleep 
makes itself felt. This automatic lapsing of ordina 
interests suggests that, under the influence of 
1 fatigue, the objects and thoughts which usually 
excite attention have temporarily lost their power 
of doing so. They have become irrelevant for the 
time being. Indeed, we may say that, when the need 
for/ 
for rest becomes acute, the whole world becomes 
irrelevant; hence the massive dissociation of sleep. 
The truth of this interpretation becomes evident 
when we consider the well-known fact that, if a 
fUndamental tendency or deep-seated interest is 
appealed to by a situation of great emergency, sleep 
may be deferred for almost incredible periods. 
This was a common occurrence in the recant wa·r. 
Another confirmation of the view suggested is to be 
found in the observation that a sleeper may be 
wakened by a minute stimulus bearing on a deep_aee.ted 
interest, even when a much greater stimulus with no 
such significance leaves sleep undisturbed. Attentiop 
has already been drawn to the liability of a sleeping 
mother to awake at the slightest sound relevant to 
her interest in her child. Another example may be 
found in an every_day observation of war-time •. 
The gunner, who sleeps undisturbed by the sounds of 
his own guns in action, may be wakened by an enemy 
shall-buret which is not eo loud, or even by a Whisper 
of warning from a comrade. Additional support for 
the view that sleep is a dissociation of' the irrel_ 
evant may be found in the study of animal behaviour. 
McDougall, in a discussion of the states of' fatigue 
, and sleep, has drawn attention to the insight into 
the nature of' these processes, which he gained from 
observing the behaviour of his dog. (Vide "An Out_ 
line/ 
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outline o:f Abnormal Psychology", Chap. III ). His 
observations played an important pe.rt in leadi~ him 
to the :formulation o:f his "Hormio Psychology" in 
general. Ha observed that, in the absence o:f a 
situation which appealed to an instinctive tendency 
and thus stirred an interest in his dog, the animal 
tended to sink into a state of quiescence and sleep. 
Thus he writes:-
"My dog, le:ft a.lone in a quiet spot, grows quiet; 
his nose sinks down upon his paws, e,nd presently I 
ha dozes. But let any one 6f a limited number o~ 
I 
i 
things occur, and instantly he is all excitement I 
j 
and activity, putting :forth a most copious :flow 
of energy. And the things or events that provoke 
such sudden outbursts of anergy are those that 
appeal to his instincts." (Op. ci t. p. Al-2 ). 
Monougall interprets this observation in the sanae 
that the dissociation leading to sleep tends to occu 
in the absence o:f circumstances that activate any 
powarrlll tendency (p.66). It would seam, therefore, 
that, when no strong interest is appealed to, the 
environment becomes irrelevant, and it is this 
irrelevance that determines the massive dissociation 
o:f sleep in its psychological aspects~ This irrel_ 
evanca may, of course, be determined either internall 
or externally. It may be determined,on the one hand, 
by the need :for rest or by poverty of interest; on 
the other hand, it may be determined by monotony of 
the/ 
the environment (a wall-known cause of sleep among 
listaBers, when a dull sermon is in progress). In 
either case, however, sleep appears to be a diseocia_ 
tion of the irrelevant. 
A process of dissociation simitar to that, which 
occurs in sleep, is ·wi tneesed in all ste.tes of :fatigue 
which ~11 short of sleep. In its physiological I 
I a.spects fatigue appears to affect the nervous system I 
~y raising the synaptic r~sistances. On the principlej 
expounded by Hughlinga Jackson, those functions of l 
the nervous system which are latest evolved are the 
moat unstable. Consequently, fa.tigue products ma.y be 
conceived as affecting most easily the synapsee in_ 
volvad in the associa.tion paths, leaving relatively 
unaffected those neuron-systems which correspond to 
fundamental activities. The physiological effects 
of fatigue would thus seam to result in relative 
isolation of the more stable neuron-systems, which 
thus tend to function independently, if activated by 
an appropriate stimulus. This is, of course, the 
phenomenon of physiological dissociation. When we 
consider the psychologice.l aspects of the fatigue_ 
state, we find the ana.logous phenomenon of psycho_ 
logical dissociation. In fatigue there is a. tendency 
for activity to become automatic and unrelated to 
consciousness. The f'a.ct that activity tends to be 
withdrawn from awareness and from conscious control 
seems/ 
seams to account in some measure ~or the mistakes 
which a ~atiguad parson is liable to make in the per_ 
~ormanca of a skilled activity, such as typewriting 
or driving a motor-car. It has been a ~requant 
defence, when a signalman has been charged with negli 
ganca leading to a railway accident, that he was worn 
out as the result of nursing a sick parson in his 
hours off' _duty. In such ce.sas 1 t is common for the 
accused parson to say that ha did not notice the.t a 
signal lever was pulled back. This does not mean 
that the relevant visual sensations were absent; it 
means that these sensations ware out of relation to I 
the general consciousness. They had become irralevan~ 
for the time being as a result of the need for rest. 
In fatigue, therefore, as in sleap,it is a case o~ 
dissociation of the irrelevant. 
A similar dissociation to that produced by 
fatigue appears to occur as a result of' the action of' 
depresse.nt drugs. Of' these drugs alcohol may be 
regarded as typical. The affect of alcohol in pro_ 
ducing dissociation has been investigated in con_ 
sidarable detail by McDougall, who makes reference to 
the result of his investigations in Chapters III and 
XXVIII" of' his "Outline of Abnormal .Psychologytt. 
McDougall points out (p.~g) that it is the blunting 
of' the critical side of aalf'_awaranaas by alcohol, 
which constitutes its charm for those who seek asca.pe 
from/ 
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from anxiety, care and mental conflict. As a result 
of ita action considerations basad on the higher 
sentiments are banished from the field of conscious_ 
naes, and the mora primitive instinctive tendencies 
gain an opportunity for expression. The removal of 
the critical functions from the conscious field leads 
to an absence of self-control, and the tendency of 
the moment fills consciousness. To quote McDougall 
(p. 70), "both introspectively and objectively this 
lack of self-control is clearly discernible in every 
stage of alcoholic intoxication". In the first stage 
this is evident in the fact that conversation loses 
its normal restraint. In the second stage, sense 
perception and skilled movements are disturbed. The 
significance of visual and auditory sensations is 
imperfectly realised, unless they are definitely rele 
1 
vant to the tendency of the moment. Movements are 
I 
I ill-adjusted, and the subject is often unaware that 
movements have taken place until he observes their 
results:- e.g. until he finds he has upset a glass 
or burnt the tablecloth with a cigarette. The drinke 
himself realises that me.ny movements oocur without 
his conscious initiation or intention. In the third 
stage, the impoverishment of consciousness is carried 
still further. The drinker becomes an automaton, .. 
almost Wholly unaware of where he is or what he is 




disappear altogether and for aleep to enaue. It ia I 
evident, then, that the psychological phenomena pro_ 
1
1 
duced by alcohol are che.racteris tic of the process of' 
dissociation. The higher sentiments and the ideals 
temporarily desert the conscious field, 
sensory and motor functions are out off 
nesa. There is, further, a tendency to 
and various I 
from conaciou~­
aubaequent I 
amnesia for the events Which take place while the 
affects of alcohol are present. In a word, there 
is evidence of that narrowing of consciousness which 
Janet found to be typical of the process of dissocia_ 
tion; in the production of this phenomenon alcohol 
may be taken as representative of the depressant drug 
as a whole,. and, in certain disea.ses a similar effect 
appears to be produced by the e.ction of toxic product • 
If then we take alcohol a.s representative of the 
whole group of dissociating drugs and toxins, it is 
not difficult to determine the nature of the mental 
elements and functions Which are dissociated. It is 
evidently a case of dissociation of the irrelevant. 
The drunken man is oblivious of all that ia irrelevan 
to the tendency of the moment. Confirmation of this 
interpretation is found in the fact that a drunk man 
may be instantly sobered, if a situation arises whic 
appeals strongly to some deep_rooted interest which 
had previously been in abeyance. Thu th · s, e reca1pt 
of bad news or a serious threat to life has frequantl 
been/ 
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been noted to exercise a sobering effect. In such a 
ca.se a large body of dissociated thoughts and functio s 
cease to be irrelevant, and the effects of dissociati n 
are overcome. 
A particularly interesting example of dissocia_ 
tion is that which seems to occur in most people in 
the presence of illness in general. Attention has 
I already been drawn to· Janet's admission that sugges_ 
tion may be a feature of other illnesses besides 
hysteria. The response, which patients admitted to 
a hospital for incurables make to any suggestion of I 
an ultimate cure, has come under the personal observa 
I 
I 
tion o:f the writer. This holds true even When the 
I 
suggestion is conveyed in subtle and unimpressive way!. 
Another aspect of this phenomenon is the dissociation 
in a patient's mind o:f lrn.owledge that his condition 
is incurable or even that the hospital, in which he 
finds himselt, is a hospital for incurables only. 
Another observation which the wri tar has ma.de is the 
extraordinary dissociation o:f medical knowledge which 
doctors and nurses show in relation to their own con_ 
dition when they are ill themselves. This, of course 
occurs chiefly When thAir illness is of a menacing 
character:- e.g. when eigne of cancer, Which would 
be obvious to them in a professional capacity, are 
present in themselves. This extraordinary feature ie 
particularly frequent among nurses. The reason that 
it is leas frequent among doctors appears to be, that 
in/ 
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in their case, medical knowledge is more thoroughly j_ 
organised, and, therefore, leas lia.ble to diasociatiof 
from the main personality, That it does occur in I 
doctors, however, has come under the writer's observat 
tion. This form of dissociation is to be distinguish d 
from the dissociation produced in illness through the 
action of bacterial and other toxins. It is not a 
generalised dissociation, but a dissociation of a 
particular group of facts, which, if brought to bear 
on the sufferer's condition, would lead to an ~J.cute 
It is thus psychologically I 
Hare we :find l 
I 
degree of unpleasure. 
and not physiologically conditioned. 
i 
l 
ourselves confronted, so far as the dissociated 
material is concerned, with a type of dissociation I 
different from any which has been hitherto consideredf 
Our consideration of phenomena of dissociation ha.s sol 
I 
I 
far led us to recognise dissociation of the irrelevan· 
and dissociation of the incompatible. Here we are 
confronted with an example of another and vary import 
ant :form of dissociation, viz. dissociation o:f the 
unpleasant. 
In the course of our enquiry we have now been 
led to consider in some detail certain of the chief 
conditions under which the normal mind exhibits 
phenomena of dissociation. The conditions to which 















States produced by depressant drugs. 
Physical illness in persona of normal 
· mentality. 
The study of these various conditions seems to 
indicate conclusively that dissociation is an every_ 
day phenomenon of the normal mind, and that it can 
only be regarded as pathological when its action is 
ill-placed or excessive. It is perhaps natural that 
medical writers should ha.ve concentrated their atten_ 
tion upon its pathological aspects, because medicine 
is primarily concerned with disease; but exclusive 
concentration upon pati1ological phenomena does not 
always lead to clarity of thought. Physiology has 
learned many lessons from pathology, it is true; but 
pathology owes a debt to physiology also. Similarly 
in the mental sphere; although psychology is deeply j 
I 
• I 
indebted to psycho-pathology, psycho-pathology in 1ts 
turn has something to learn from normal psychology. 
Indeed, one of the greatest needs of psycho-pathology 
at the present time is to bring its conceptions into 
line with what is known about normal mental processes~ 
It is because it seams to the present writer that the 
current conception of dissociation has baan basad too 
exclusively upon the study of abnormal phenomena of 
dissociation that so much attention has been devoted 







mani~estationa. Only when normal as well as abnorma~ 
dissociation is studied can the full significance of I 
the process be properly understood. 
Tha importance o~ recognising normal aa wall as 
abnormal mani~eatations of dissociation may be 
gathered, when we consider the theory which Janet ad-
vances to explain the dissociative procaaa. While 
Janet's formulation of the conception of dissociation 
must put psycho-pathology (and psychology also) 
forever in hie debt, the theory, Which he puts forwaru 
I 
I 
to explain it, has serious limitations. These limita~ 
I 
tions would doubtles~ have been avoided, if Janet hadl'1 
paid more attention to the normal manifestations of 
I 
dissociation. Had he done so, it is doubtful if he 
would have explained dissociation as due to a ~ailure 
of mental synthesis. Yet this is the explanation whiph 
his study of the phenomena of hysteria leads him to 
offer. His observation of hysterical patients led 
him to summarise the various "accidents" and "stigmat ", 
which they eXhibit, under the formula "retraction of 
the field of conaciouaneaa" (The Major Symptoms of 
Hysteria, p.303). This he interpreted as due to 
"A spacial moral weakness, consisting in the lack of 
power, on the part of the feeble subject, to gather, 
to condense the psychological phenomena, and assimila a 
them to hie paraonality"(op. cit. p.311.) 
Hysteria thus comes to be regarded as "A malady of 
the/ 
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the personal synthesis" (p.332), due to "a depression, 
an exhaustion of' the higher functions of' the encephelfn" 
(p.333); it is the result of various circumstances in 
which the nervous tension is lowered. As a consa_ 
quenca of this lowering of nervous tension, Janet 
holds that «consciousness, which is no longer able to 
perform too complex operations, gives up some of them' 
(p.334). This process of giving up complex mental 
functions because the personal consciousness has not 
strength to retain them is, for Janet, the essence of 
the process of dissociation. 
Janet's theory, that dissociation is due to a 
failure of mental synthesis dependent on lack of 
mental energy,has two important implications:- both 
of which impair the usefulness of his conception of 
the process. These implications a. re:_ 
1. That dissociation is a negative or passive proces , 
2. That it is essentially an abnorm~l process. 
These features of Janet's conception of dissociation 
set it in marked contrast to the conception of re_ 
pression which Freud was led to formulate from the 
study of hysterical phenomena. According to Freud, 
repression is an active, dynamic process. It is not 
due to fa.ilure of mental energy as a result of which 
certain elements fall out of personal conaciouanass; 
on the contrary, to use Freud's words, "The essence 
of repression lies simply in the fUnction of reject.inr 
and/ 
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(collectel and keeping something out of' consciousness" I 
I 
papers Vol. IV, p. BA). Further, once the stu1y of' · 1 
hysteria had led him to recognise the process of' re_ 
pression, it was not long before he began to seek for 
evidence of' its presence in various phenomena of' 
everyday occurrence among normal indi vi due,ls. The 
first of' such phenomena in which he recognised its 
presence ware (1) the minor mistakes to which normal 
individuals are subject, e.g. slips of' the tongue, 
the mislaying of objects, and the forgetting of 
familiar names, (2) dreams. The word "repressed" 
first occurs in Freud's writings in a Paper "On the 
Psychical.Mache,nism of Hysterical Phenomena" written 
in collaboration with Brauar in 1892 (Op. cit. Vol.I, 
p.33), but it was only in a Paper entitled "The Defen a 
Psycho-neuroses" published in 1894 that ha first 
formulated the idea of repression in a definite form. 
Yet, already in 1898 ha had published a Paper on 
"Forgetting", iri Which he applied the conception of 
repression to the explanation of such ordinary expar1 
ences as when a name, the hour of an appointment or 
soma significant fact appears, for no obvious reason, 
to slip out of the mind. This paper was later em_ 
bodied in hie "Psycho-pathology of Every-day Lifett, 
(1904). Meanwhile the year 1900 had witnessed the 
appearance of hie famous "Traumdeutung", in which th 
conception of repression is applied to the alucidatio 
of the problems of the dream. 
Freud' e/ 
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Freud's conception of repression as an active, 
dynamic process stands in marked contrast to Janet'e 
conception of dissociation as a passive process due 
to failure of mental energy - a contrast all the more 
remarkable in view of the fact that it was to explain 
the same phenomena that the two conceptions were 
originally framed. That the study of hysteria should 
lead Janet and Fraud to such different ideas of the 
process involved is, however, not difficult to under_ 
stand. It is largely due to the preconceptions with 
which they started. Janat's interpretation is in_ 
fluenced by the atomistic psychology Which he in_ 
herited from the Associationists. Freud's interpre_ 
tation, on the other hand, was influenced by the 
atmosphere created in Teutonic countries by the 
philosophies of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. It 
remains true, however, to say that, if Janet had, lik 
Freud, sought confirmation of his views m.mong the 
phenomena of every-day life, he would probably have 
modified them considerably. If he had recognised the 
existence of normal as well ae of abnormal dissocia._ 
tion, it is difficult to imagine that he would have 
explained it as due to a mare failure of mental 
synthesis. The study of normal phenomena of dis-
sociation, which has been undertaken in the preceding 
pagas,makes it impossible to accept the view that 
dissociation is essentially a passive process. The 
fa.ct I 
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fact that it is an essentially active process is best 
realised when attention is directed to the natura o~ 
the material which ia subject to dissociation. In 
the preceding study special attention has bean d 
to the nature of this material, and it was found that 
in the phenomena considered, the dissociated elements 
and runctions could be claeai~ied as ~alling under 
one o~ three categories:-
1. The irrelevant. 
2. The incompatible. 
:3. The unplease,nt. 
The fact that in each case the dissociated elements 
fall under one of these categories seams to the write 
to provide a key to the understanding of the process 
of dissociation. 
It ie mainly as a result of failure to pay 
adequate attention to the natura of' what is dissocia.t d, 
that Janet ~ails to· do justice to the conception of' 
dissociation, for Which we owe him such a debt. His 
attention was directed mainly to a description o~ 
the p~ocess itself and, in a lesser degree, to a 
description of' the conditions or "Agents provocateurs" 
which ·favour its development, e.g. emotion, physical 
disease, psychical trauma, etc. ("Vide L 'Etat Mental 
I 
des Hysteriques", p.446). He devoted: little, if' an., 
attention to the dissociated material itself'. In the 
case of' Freud, on the other hand, it was reflection 
' upon/ 
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upon the mental content involved that led him to his 
conception of repression as an active and dynamic 
process. Both writers were struck by the prominence 
of amnesia in the symptomatolo~y of hysteria. At the 
beginning of his book "The Major Symptoms of' Hysteria', 
it is true that Janet asks his readers "To put in the 
first line, as the most typical, the most character_ 
istic syroptom of hysteria, a moral symptom - that is 
somnambulism" (p.23); but he adds later, (p.12~) 
ttit is amnesia that is the stigma of somnambulism 91 • 
While recognising the importance of amnesia as a 
characteristic of hysteria., however, Janet was conten 
to note that part of' the mental content had been cut 
off from consciousness and to seek an explanation of 
this fact in the appearance of psychic weakness Which 
the process in itself seemed to imply. Fraud, on the 
other hand, While also recognising that consciousness 
had suffered a loss of content, found an explanation 
in the nature of the content itself. As the result o 
his efforts to revive the forgotten memories of his 
patients, he found that these patients had in each 
case "enjoyed good health up to the time at Which an 
intolerable idea presented itself within the content 
of their ideational life." (Collected Papers", Vol. I, 
p.Bl. ). It was in the intolerable nature of the 
idea that Freud found the key to the amnesia involved 
It was for this reason that he designated hysteria as 
a/ 
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a "Defence Psychoneurosis" (1894), and that he came 
to regard repression as a dynamic process whereby 
consciousness is protected from intolerable mental 
content. Since, however, no one, even the moat norma , 
I 
is entirely exempt from the influence of' intolerable 
ideas, Freud was able to extend the process of' re_ 
pression to cover many phenom~rta which cannot reason_ 
ably be regarded as pathological and to recognise 
repression as a process which occurs in the normal 
mind. From this point of' view, repression is only 
regarded as pathological when, as in the case of' 
hysteria, it gives rise to symptoms Which unf'it their 
victim f'or normal lif'e. 
In view of' the f'act that Freud framed his con_ 
caption of' repression in the light of' the mental con_ 
tent upon Which h·e found repression to be exercised, 
1 t has seemed desirable to remedy Je,net' a f'ailure to 
adopt a similar procedure in the case of' the concep_ 
tion of' dissociation. It is f'or this reason that 
attention has been drawn in the preceding pages to 
the nature· of' the mental elements involved in the 
process o~ dissociation. The consideration o~ vario e 
dissociation-phenomena in the normal mind has led to 
the conclusion that, at any given time When diasocia_ 
tion occurs, the mental content which is involved is 
either irrelevant, incompatible or unpleasant in the 
light of the situation with Which the organism is f'ac d.· 
Dissociation/ 
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Dissociation of the irrelevant was found in our 
analysis to occur conspicuously in states o~ ~atigue 
and sleep and under the in~luence o~ depressant drugs 
Dissociation of the incompatible was found t~ occur 
under the influence of emotion, suggestion and hypnot 
ism. This type of dissocifttion ia also seen in What 
may be desc~ibed a,e "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde" phenomena 
The church-warden who overcharges his cuato~ers durin 
the week without being conscious o~ an inconsistency 
is the subject of a dissociation of this kind. A 
similar dissociation is perhaps also involved in the 
stamping out of unsuccessful methods which is a 
feature o~ trial-and-error learning. Dissociation of 
the unpleasant was illustrated in our analysis by the 
failure of many persona suffering from organic diseas 
to recognise the gravity of their condition, even 
when they possess the knowledge which would seam to 
make such an inference inevitable. In such cases it 
ia the unpleasantness of the facta that cuts them off 
from the operation of the critical faculties. The 
tendency of the average person to shelve thoughts abo t 
his own death is another example of this form of die_ 
- I 
eociation, as is hie tendency to speak of "the good 
old times", remembering the pleasant features of the 
past to the exclusion of the unpleasant. Another 
example of dissociation of the unpleasant is to be 
found in the frequently noted phenomenon that a perso , 
faced/ 
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faced with a grave·emergency, may experience no emoti n 
but impassively note trivial and unimporte.nt features 
of the environment. Da.vid Livingetone records that 
an experience of this sort occurred to him, when a 
lion waa mauling his arm. This instance is quoted 
by Rivers as an example of repression ("Instinct and 
the Unconscious", p.n8), but it would seem to partake 
rather of the nature of a simple dissociation of the 
unpleasant. A certain group of "Shell-shock" caeaa 
so frequently seen in the war appear also to be beat 
explained as due to a dissociation of this sort. 
This is particularly true of cases in which amnesia o· 
functional blindness followed a traumatic experience. 
Acta of forgetting furnish an interesting group 
in relation to the classification of dissociated 
material into the irrelevant, the incompatible and 
the unpleasant, because each of these categories me.y 
be illustrated in the forgotten content. Moat of our 
forgetting perhaps, is forgetting of the irrelevant. 
This is due to the fact. that, when we are faced with 
any given situation, our attention is selective. 
Professor William James draw attention to this point, 
when he described selection as one of the cardinal 
functions of consciousness. Consciousness, he says, 
"is always interested mora in one part of its object 
than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses 
all the while j_ t thinks". ("The Principles of' Psych-
ology",/ 
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Psychology", 1891, Vol.I. p.284). LElter he adds:-
"We do far more than emphasize things,.and unite some 
and keep others apart. We eJctually ignore most of 
the things before us"; and again, "Millions of i tarns 
of the outward order are pres.ent to my senses Which 
never properly enter into my experience. Why? 
Because they have no interest for me. My experience 
is what I agree to attend to" (Op. cit., p.402). 
In accepting these statements, we must recognise, of 
course, that the "agreeing" and ,.ignoring" of Which 
Jamas speaks are not voluntary processes, but spont_ 
aneous processes determined by distribution of in_ 
terest. In this sense the ignoring process is simply 
an example of dissociation. When we forget the na.me 
of a person, whose name ought to be familiar, this is 
commonly due to a tendency in ue to ignore his exist-
ence because we are not interested in him. This, 
indeed, is usually the way in which the person con_ 
earned is inclined to interpret it. Much of our 
forgetting, therefore, is due to selectivity of 
interest. What does not interest us tends to be 
ignored. In other words, what is irrelevant tends to 
be dissociated. 
Not all forgetting, however, can be explained as 
due to dissociation of the irrelevant. Forgetting 
also ba due to dissociation of the incompatible - . 
. of the acts of forgetting, which Freud describes in 
his/ 
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his "Psychopathology of Every_day Life" appea.r to be 
of this natura. F'reud explains them, of course, in 
terms of "repression". That, in the writer's opinion 
he is wrong in doing eo follows from the view of 
repression which·Will be developed later: as the 
relationship of repression to dissociation has not 
yet been examined, it is sufficient to point out here' 
that many such acta of forgetting are examples of 
dissocia.tion of the inc.ompati ble. This seems to be 
the case When we forget where we have put a borrowed 
article, which we have been asked to return before wel 
have· finished with it. This common phenomenon appear, 
to be due, not to the fact that the lost memory is 
irrelevant, but to the fact that it is incompatible 
with a desire. 
An act of forgetting may also be due to die_ 
aociation of the unpleasant. The tendency to forget 
an unpleasant fact is so familiar as to need little 
illustration. The "nouveau riche" tends to 
circumstances of his early life; the man in financia.l 
difficulties tends to forget about a bill; the fe.sti 
ioua patient is more likely to forget to take an 
unplee,sant than a plee.aant medicine. 
Among acta of forgetting we thus find examples 
of dissociation b~longing to each of the three cats-
gories. It must be remembered, of course, that 
certain phenomena. may fall into more than one catego 
Thus,/ 
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Thus, the forgetting of an inconvenient appointment 
may be due to the fact that its fulfilment is incom_ 
patible with our purposes and unpleasant at the sa,me 
time. In such cases, however, it is usually found 
that one aspect is predominant, and it is possible to 
classify moat dlsaociation-phenomena under one or 
other of the three categories. 
The fact that acta of forgetting provide such a 
comprehensive field for the study of dissociation in 
, its various forms accords well with the importance 
which the phenomenon of amnesia played in the developrl 
ment of both Janet's and Freud's views. "Amnesia" 
says McDougall "is one of the most common forms in 
which dissociation reveals itself. Without unduly 
straining the sense of the words, it may be said that 
every dissociation is an amnesia". ( 0 An Outline of 
Abnormal Psychology", p. 23~). While it would be a 
mistake to regard a.mnesia a.s co-extensive with die_ 
sociation, a.s McDougall seems to do, it remains true 
that the process of forgetting is perhaps the most. 
representative of all the manifestations of dissocia_ 
tion. The forgotten material may show any of the 
three characteristics Which tend to provoke dissocia_ 
tion. It may be irrelevant or incompatible or un_ 
pleasant; but it always seems to possess one at least 
of these characteristics. The question now arises 
whether it is possible to find a comprehensive term 
which/ 
which shall embrace all three categories of dissoc_ 
iated material. To find such a term does not eaam an 
easy task, but, for want of a better, the term 
"Unacceptable" may be suggested. Diesocia.tion than 
may be defined in the :following terms:- Dissociation 
is a mental process whereby unacceptable mental con-
tent or an unacceptable mental :function becomes cut 
off :from personal consciousness:- such mental content 
or function being regarded as unacceptable if it is 
either irrelevant to an active interest incompatible 
with an active interest or unpleasant in relation to 
an active interest. 
From this point o:f view, Dissociation must be 
regarded as another aspect o:f that process o:f Selecti n, 
which j'ames regarded as one o:f the cardinal :functions 
of consciousness and which Drever describes as a 
:funda~nantal "characteristic o:f the psychical", 
("P.n Introduction to the Psychology of Educationtt, 
192R, p.29). This way of regarding dissociation has 
several implications, Which may now be considered. 
1. Dissociation is in itself a normal process, 
although, like other mental processes, it has a path-
olo~y of its own. This point need not be stressed, 
as many pages have already been devoted to a descrip_l 
tion of various normal dissociation-phenomena. 
Attention may, however, be drawn :for a moment to 
certain phenomena which occur in cases, which exhibit 
an/ 
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an unusual absence of dissociation. Such a case came 
under the writer's observation, when he held the post 
of Assistant Physician in the Royal Edinburgh Hospita 
for Mental and Nervous Diseases. The patient was a 
man well up in years, who was of defective intelligen~a, 
I 
and had spent a large part of his life in the Hospita.t. 
This patient showed a most astounding memory for de_ 
tails which would have been irrelevant to an ordinary 
person. He could name the birthday of practically 
every person who had been on the Sta.ff of the Hospita. 
since his admission, and he could name the dates on 
which each had come and departed. Other cases of a 
similar nature have frequently been noted in litera_ 
ture. In all such cases, memory is characterised by 
an absence of selection, and defect of dissociation 
which must be regarded as pathological. The phenom_ 
anon of «Total recall", which so frequently character_ 
iaea the reminiscences of unintelligent persons, is 
another example of what happens in the absence of an 
adequate degree of dissociation. It may also be 
suggested that the prolific and disconnected nature 
I of the conversational stream so characteristic of 
mania is due to the same cause. While, however, an 
inadequate degree of dissociation is abnormal, it 
none the less holds true that an excess of disaocia_ 
tion is abnormal also:- whether it be a general exce s 




I researches of' Janet render it needless to stress thisi 
. I 
point, Which is generally recognised at the expense of 
I the fact that dissociation is not necessarily abnorme.l 
2. Another implication of the view of dissocia_ 
tion which has been reached is the.t it is e.n essen_ 
tially active process. This fact has been largely 
obscured as a result of Janet's formulation. Janet's 
explanation of dissociation as the result of a failur 
of mental synthesis shows that he conceived it as a 
passive process:- something that tended to occur 
automatically unless considerable energy was expanded! 
in preventing it doing so. According to this view, 
dissociated mental elements would seem to "get lost" 
I 
rather than to be "cut off". This point of view, as! 
has already been pointed out, is the result of Janet'~ 
failure to study the nature of the dissociated materi 1. 
If the analysis Which has been undertaken in this 
thesis is correct, the Characteristic feature of die_ 
sociated material lies in the fact that it is in some 
way unacceptable to the subject. This being so, it 
is difficult to regard dissociation as a paseive pro_ 
I cess of lapsing. It seems more reasonable to seek a ! 
I 
rationale of tha process of dissocia.tion in the naturr 
of the material which is dissociated. It would be 
difficult to find a rationale of war, apart from the 
realisation that the combatants are hostile. 




material, it seems likely that it is because 
material is unacceptable that it comes to be 
the ll 
dissocia. 
ted. Dissociation, therefore, in its psychological 
aspect, would seem to be a process directed towe.rds a_ 
end:- the end being exclusion from consciousness of 
the unacceptable. It is, therefore, essentially an 
active process, not a process such as Janet describes 
it whe~ he says:_ 
\ I I "La synthase etant trop fa.i ble, certaines categori s 
de sensations,d'images ou d'id~es sont laiss~es d 
c~te" •••• " (Italics not in original). ( "L 'Etat 
I 
Mental des Hysteriques", p.634). 
Janet's way of representing the process in this 
passage obscures the real nature of the process of 
dissociation. It is not a question of elements 
passively dropping out of co~sciousness or of being 
left aside, but rather of their being actively cut 
off from consciousness. Perhaps it is better still 
describe the process from the point of view of con_ 
eciouanasa, and to say that it is a case of conscious 
ness, eo to speak, "turning away from" what is un_ 
a.cceptable. This metaphor of "turning away" is 
perhaps preferable to that of "cutting off" in that 
it brings the process of dissociation more in line 
with what we know of the process of selection. Eithe 
metaphor may, however, be usefully employed. Wa may 
avoid/ 
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avoid a horrible sight either by holding up our hends 
to out off the view or by looking in another direotio • 
The effect is the same in either oa.se, and in either 
case activity is involved. \~ether, therefore, we 
conceive dissociation as a process whereby the un_ 
acceptable is out off from consciousness, or as a 
process whereby attentive consciousness avoids the 
unacceptable, in either case it is an active process. 
3. Brief reference may be made to a third implioaL 
tion of the view of dissociation at Which we have 
arrived. It is an unconscious or unwitting process; I 
that is to say, the subject is not eware that the 
process is going on, he can only be aware of the re_ 
eulte of the process. That it is not a consciously 
controlled process is evident to ahyone who has made 
an effort to go to sleep when sleep did not come. 
All that the would-be eleeper can do is to put himeel 
under the beet conditione for dissociation to occur. 
This is what we do when we go to bed. The process o 
dissociation is, however, not only not consciously 
controlled, it is not conscious at all. The hyster_ 
ical patient· may know that a limb is paralysed be-
cause he cannot move it, but the dissociative prooeea1 
itself is not in conaoiousnaes. Further, the patient 
may not even be aware that the dissociation has take 
place. This f'a.ot has been. pointed out by Janat :-
"When you 1Natoh a hysterical patient for the fire 
time, or when you study patients coming from the 
country, I 
90. 
country, who have not yet been examined by 
specialists, you will find, like ourselves, that, 
without suffering from it and without suspecting 
it, they have the deepest and most extensive j 




p. 161. ) I 
I From these considerations it ia evident that diasocia~ 
tion is an unwitting process. I 
4. A fourth implication of the conception of I 
dissociation, which has been reached, is that the I 
process is in line with a fundamental biological pro_l 
cess. Draver, in 11 An Introduction to the Psychology I 
of Education" (Chap. III), describes three fundamental' 
characteristics of the life-process of living organ_ 
isms and points out that these are specially character-
istic of thdt aspect of the life_process which we 
call "psychical". These three characteristics are 
1. Conservation, 2. Selection, and 3. Cohesion. 
Conservation is represented by all that is involved 
when we speak of "learning by experience". If con_ 
! 
servation is the basis of all mental development, 
selection is What determines the direction develop_ 
ment will take. If all experience were conserved, I 
learning by experience would be impossible. We shoul~ 
never learn to do a thing properly, if all our errors 
were conserved on equal terms with our successes. 





The most obvious psychical manifestation of selection\ 
-i 
ia found in all that is signified Vlhen we spee,k of' 
•attention", but "interest" more nearly expresses the 
range of ita operation. Conservation and selection 
are, however, inadequate without cohesion. Vfhat is 
conserved under the influence of' ael9ction is not 
conserved as a mere aggregate, but as an organised 
whole. All the phenomena of' '1association" are to be 
included under the broader concept of' cohesion. 
Dissociation, on the other hand, comes under the 
category of' selection, and is thus in line with a 
fundamental biological tendency. Dissociation ia 
ultimately an expression of selection in its negative, 
I 
aspect, but, since it involves rejection, it is none I 
the leas active on that account. Rejection is deter_ 
mined by some ruling interest; and, whether it be a 
case of' dissociation of the irrelevant, dissociation 
of' the incompatible or dissociation o:f the unpleasant 
in each case active rejection ie involved. Of the 
three manifestations of' dissociation, dissociation 
of the unpleasant must be regarded as the most prim_ 
itive. The activity of the unicellular organism seam 
to consist either in approximation to food and favour 
able conditions or withdrawal from noxious stimuli. 
So far as we can imagine the psychical life of such I 
I 
an organism, we must regard it as characterised almos~ 
exclusively by states corresponding to pleasure and 
unplea.eure,/ 
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unplaasure, according as its fundamental tendencies 
are facilitated or impeded. Selection at this level 
is selection of the pleasant; dissociation may 
caivad as dissociation of the unpleasant. At a higha 
level of life, when the multicellular stage is raache 
and organs are developed, we may conceive that dis-
sociation of the irrelevant is added to dissociation 
of the unpleasant. This may be conceived as occurrin 
when the stage is reached at which the phenomenon of 
a life-cycle appears. When this stage is reached, 
what is relevant at one phase of life becomes irral_ 
avant at another phase of life. Hare perhaps we find 
the key to the development of dissociation of the 
irrelevant, whereby stimuli affective at one phase 
become ineffective at another. At a still higher 
level in the scala of life, When the nervous system 
has become organised in such a way as to render a 
variety of movements and co-ordinations possible, we 
may conceive the establishment of the third form of 
dissociation:- dissociation of the incompatible. 
By this agency functions incompatible with the pra_ 
vailinv activity are rendered inoperative, and stimul 
which would produce behaviour incompatible With the 
prevailing interest are rendered incapable of pro-
ducing a reaction. 
Although the hiarachy of dissociation-functions 
which has been sketched in the last paragraph, is 
admittedly/ 
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admittedly speculative, yet the writer feels that it 
gives some biological justification for the view of 
dissociation Which has been reached in the present 
section of this thesis. This vie\V may be summarised 
in a modification of the definition already given, 
as follows: .. Dissociation is an active mental pro_ 
ceas, whereby unacceptable mental content or an un_ 
acceptable mental function becomes cut off from per_ 
eonal conscious~ess, without thereby ceasing to be 
mental:- such mental content or mental function being 
''unacceptable" within the meaning of this definition 
if it is either irrelevant to, incompatible with, or 
unpleasant in relation to an active interest. 
REPRES.S ION. 
The conception of repression was originally 
introduced by Freud to explain the same group of 
phenomena which had led Janet to formulate hie con_ 
caption of dissociation. The history of the develop-
ment of Fre~d's view·s shows that he pursued a path 
independent of that of Janet. As Mitchell points out 
("The Psychology of Medicine", p. 42), some years be_ 
fore the publication of Janet'e first work, Freud's 
interest had been intrigued by the fact that some of 
tha symptoms of a hysterical patient, whom Breuer an 
he were treating by hypnotism, were permanently 
relieved/ 
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relieved after some forgotten episodes in her life 
were recalled in the hypnotic state (vide Freud, 
"Collected Papers", Vol. I, p.28). Breuer ha.d for 
some time realised the therapeutic value of reviving 
forgotten memories under hypnotism, but it was left 
for Freud to develop from this observation the whole 
body of psycho-analytic theory, centring, as it does 
round the concept of repression. It was this observ ~ 
tion that led Freud in 1893 to state his conclusion 
"that hysterical patients suffer principally from 
reminiscences" (Op. ci t. Vol. I. p. 29 ). The t.,vo fe.cts 
which attracted his notice about these reminiscenoas 
seem to have been, (1) that they were related to 
experiences of a distressing or traumatic kind (Vide 
Op. ci t. Vol. I. p. 27), (2) that they were rtnot at 
the disposal of the patient in the way that his more 
commonplace memories are" (Vol.I. p.31). In relation 
to this second point, Freud noticed that it was only 
under hypnosis that the memories could be restored in 
any but the moat inadequate way (Vol.I, p.32). 
Ths fact that memories withdrawn from the possibility 
of ordinary recollection could be revived with in_ 
tense vividness under hypnosis led Freud increasingly 
to the belief that "That epli tting of consciousness, 
which is so striking in the well-known classical case 
of 'double conscience', exists in a rudimentary 
f'aahion in every hysteria e.nd that the tendenoy to 
this dissociation - and therewith to the production 
of/ 
of abnormal states of consciousness, Which may be in_ 
eluded under the term 'hypnoid' - is a fUndamental 
manifestation of this neurosis." (Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 3f). 
Fraud's reference to 'splitting of consciousness' andl 
'dissociation' a,s fundamental chare,cteristics of 
hysteria reminds us at once of Janet's theory. Indeed 
Freud is careful to add, in the following sentence, ~~ 
that "this view is in agreement with those of Binet 
and the two Janats't. This reference, in a paper l 
written in 1893, to Janat's conception of dissociatio 
raises the question whether Fraud was not indebted 
to Janat for the conception which lad subsequently to 
his theory of repression. This is whe.t Ja.net himsel 
cl~imad in a paper read before The Intarne,tional 
Congress of Medicine in London in 1913. While, hovf_ 
aver, Freud was undoubtedly aware of Janat's in_ 
vastigations as they ware published, it would be wro 
to say that ha was inspired by them. On the contrar~, 
1\ \ _I 
what inspiration he received from the Salpatriara wa · 
due to Janat's teacher, Charcot, with whom Fraud 
studied in 188n-8. It was on his return to Vienna 
from Paris in 1888 that, in collaboration with hie 
aenior colleague Brauar, ha made the observations 
about hidden memories Which lad subsequently to hie 
theory of repression. Theaa observations had bean 
made and subjected to reflection (although they had 
not been published), before the appearance of Janet• 
first work. There is every justification, therefo~e, / 
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therefot'e, for rega.rding Freud's and Janet' s theories 
as being independent developments deriving their 
impetus from the inspiration of a common teacher _ 
Charcot. I 




oped by Freud in independence of Janet 1 s conception J 
of dissociation. Freud and his followers have usua.llf 
regarded it as an alternative and mora satisfactory j 
conception elaborated for the explanation of a common! 
body of facta. The actua.l fact that there exists, in 
hysteria and other pathological states, a body of 
mental elements cut off :from personal consciousness 
is not in dispute between the two schools. In eo far 
as the term 'dissociation' is used to describe the l 
existence of such a state, Freud is prepared to recog 
nise the existence of dissociation, and occasionally 
1
1 
ha uaea the word itself. Thus in 1910 ha writes 
"Psycho-analysis, too, accepts the hypothesis of 
dissociation and of the unconscious." (Op. ci t. Vol. I , 
p.107 ). Where his .theory differs from Janat' s is in 
the axple.nation of this state o:f dissocia.tion. 
According to Janat's theory the splitting of conscio 
nese ia a primary feature of hysteria; for Fraud it 
is a secondary feature.(vide Op. cit. Vol.I. p.AO). 
What lad Fraud to regard it as a secondary feature 
was hia consideration of the material which ia die_ 
socia.ted. His observation of the painfUl nature of 
the/ 
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the dissociated material led him to the view that the 
dissociative process was of the nature o:f a defence. 
since defence is an active, not a passive process, ha 
was unable, like Janet, to e.ttri bute the process to a 
mere :failure o:f mental synthesis resulting :from lack 
o:f mental energy. Freud's :first difference with 
Breuer _ the prelude to their :final separation _ 
appears to have arisen over this point. In a paper 
"on the History o:f the Psycho-e.na.lytic Movement" 
published in 1914, Freud expresses himself thus:-
"The :first difference between Breuer and myself 
came to light in regard to a question concerning 
the :finer psychical mechanism o:f hysteria. Ha 
gave preference to a theory which was still to 
some extent physiolcgical·, as one might call it; 
he wished to explain the mental dissociation o:f 
hysteria by the absence o:f communication between 
various psychical states (states o:f consciouanes 
as we called them at that time), and he thare:for 
constructed the theory o:f 'hypnoid' sta.tes, the 
effects o:f which ware supposed to penetra.te into 
waking consciousness like unassimilated foreign. 
bodies. I had taken the matter lees ace.demica.ll 
everywhere I seemed to discern motives and tend-
enciee analogous to those of everyday life, and 
I looked upon mental dissocia.tion itself as an 
effect o:f a process o:f rejection which at that 
time I called defence, and later called repreasi 
(Op. cit. Vol.I. p.291-2). 





The idea. that the dissociative process was essenl 
tially one whereby consciousness is defended against 
unbearable ideas only came to Freud after he had give 
up using hypnosis ae a method of reviving forgotten 
memories. In the earlier days of his association wit 
Breuer, he followed hie colleague in using hypnosis 
to affect that revival of memories Which had been 
found to result in the relief' of symptoms. As .time 
went on, however, he found that there were some patie ts 
who ware difficult or impossible to hypnotise. In 
attempting to revive memories in these unhypnotisable 
patients, he adopted the procedure Which he had eeen 
Bernheim use in trying to revive in the waking con_ 
aciouaness of patients events Which had taken place 
in the hypnotic state. In the attempt to revive 
forgotten memories in unhypnotised patients after 
this fashion, Freud found himself compelled to exer_ 
cise a certain element of pressure. This feet led 
him to conclude that there must be some force in the 
patient's mind actively opposing hie efforts:- a fore 
which he designated "Resistance•. It wa.a not long 
before he drew a ~rther conclusion _ the conclusion, 
namely, that the force which prevented the revival 
of forgotten memories was the vary force that had 
originally banished the memories from consciouenasa. 
It was to this process that ha gave the name of 
"Repression" _ a conception which he regards as 
" i on . The foundat on_stone~Wh1ch the whole structure of 
Psycho-analysis/ 
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paycho-ana.lysia rests" {Op. cit . Vol . I . p . ?.97), end 
yet "Nothine but a theoretical formulation of a 
1 phenomenon Which may be observed to reour as often aa 
one undertakes an analysis of a neurotic without 
resorting to hypnosis". {Vol. I . 298 ). 
For Freud, therefore, HThe essence of repression 
lies simply in the function of rejecting and keeping 
something out of consciousness 11 (Op. ci t . Vol . IV. p . SA). 
This being the essential function of repression accorf-
ing to Freud, what are ita other cha racteristics? I 
From Freud ' s writings we may isolate two as the moat 
important:-
1. Repression is conceived ae an active process 
This is evident from a remark which follows shortly 
after that which was last quoted: -
"The process of repression ie not to be regarded 
ae something which takes pla.ce once for all, the 
results of which are permanent, ae when some 
living thing has been killed and from that time 
onward is dead: on the contrary, repression deman s 
a constant expenditure of energy, and if this 
were discontinued the success of the repression 
would be jeopardised, eo that a fresh act of 
repression would be necessarv. We may i magine 
that What ie repressed exercises a continuous 
straining in the direction of consciousness, so 
that the balance has to be kept by means of a 
steady counter-pressure. " (Op. cit. Vol . IV, p. 89_ 0 ) 
2./ I 
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2. Repression is an unconscious process _ a fs.c 
which is better expressed in Rivers' terminology by 
saYing that it is "unvri ttingrt (Ins tine t and the Un_ 
conscious, p.l6). This feature Freud's rtRepression" 
shares with Janet's "Dissociation". That repression 
is unwitting is inferred by Freud from the ignorance 
which the patient shows of the fact that such a pro_ 
cess is at work ~n his own mind. Not only is he un_ 
avrare that repression ha.s taken place at all, but he 
is unaware of the resistance which the therapeutic 
effort to revive repressed material to consciousness 
inve.riably meets (vide Freud, "The Ego and the I du 
1927, P.le). 
If these, then, are the main characteristics of 
the process of' repression, what, we may next a.sk, a.re 
the main chare.oteristics of the repressed mEtterial 
according to Freud's scheme? These again are two in 
number:_ 
1. The repressed material in unconscious. Freu 
thus rejects the idea which seems to be implied in 
Janet's ttsub_conscious", that material which is cut 
off from personal consciousness has a consciousness 
of its own. "What is proved", he says, "is not a 
second consciousness in us, but the existence of 
certain mental operations la..cking in the qua.li ty of' 
consciousness" (Collected Papera't Vol.IV, p.l03). 
The known cases of "double conscience", he holds, 
prove nothing against his view:_ 
"They/ 
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"They may most accurately be described as cases 
of a splitting of tb.e montal activities into two 
groups, whereby a single consciousness takes up 
its position alternately with either the one or 
the other of these groups" (Op. ci t. Vol. IV, 
p. 103-4). 
2. The other great characteristic of repressed 
material, in Freud's scheme, is that it is unpleasant 
or rather it is of such e. character tb.at, if it becam 
conscious, it would cause unpleasure. Already in 189 , 
speaking of the "Defence Psycho-neurosesu Freud state 
that what is repressed is "an intolerable idea. Which 
was in painful opposition to the patient's ego". 
(Op. cit. Vol.I. p.lnn). It is essentially the same 
fact which he is expressing in 1920 When he says that 
the aim of the resistance is "to avoid the 'pain' 
that would be aroused by the release of the repressed 
material" ("Beyond the Pleasure Principle", 1922, 
p.20.) 
such being the main featureainvolved in the 
Freudian conception of repression, "Repression" in 
his sense, though not in his words, may be defined as 
an active mental process essentially consisting in 




The next task which fa.lla to our enquiry is to 
examine the process of repression with a view to 
determining whether or not Freud has conceived it in 
a satisfactory fashion. If now we turn to this task, 
we shall do well to direct our attention, not to the 
psychosis or psychoneurosis, but to a phenomenon whic 
is not necessarily pathological, viz. the dream. 
Freud was the first to realise adequately the import_ 
ance of the dream in mental life, just as he was the 
first to formulate the concept of repression; and it 
is si.p.;nificant that in his "Introductory Lectures on 
Psycho-analysis", he makes the study of the dream 
(Book II) the basis upon which he develops his genera 
theory of the neuroses (Book III). FUrther it was 
mainly through Freud's "Traumdeutung", published in 
1900, that the· medical and psychological v;orld were 
introduced to the theory of repression. If·, then, we! 
turn to the examination of Freud's dream-theory, we 
find the whole crux of the theory to lie in the con_ 
cept of' distortion:_ a concept with which that of the 
"Censorship" is intimately connected. The importanc 
of' the concept of' distortion is evident from a note 
in Chap. VI of the "Traumdeutung", where Fraud writes:-
"I consider this reference of dream-disfigurement 
to the censor as the essence of my dream-theory." 
(Freud, "The Interpretation of' Dreams~·, Revised 
Edition, reprinted May 1919, p.287). 
According/ 
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According to F'reud'a theory, 
"We should then assume in each hu.rnan being, as· the 1 
primary cause of dream formation, two psychic I 
forces (streams, systems), of vrhich one constituter 
the wish expressed by the dream, While the other j 
acts as a censor upon this dream wish, and by i 
means of this censoring forces a distortion of 
its expression." (Op. cit. p.l21.) 
I 
The dream, therefore, owes its distinctive character l 
to two facts:-
1. that there is a barrier to the entry of the latsn
1 
I 
dream-thoughts into the dream-consciousness; 
2. that this barrier may be pe.ssed, if the dream_ 
thoughts are suitably modified. 
The existe·nce of the barrier and the neceesi ty for 
distortion of the dream-thoughts, if they are to pass 




process of repression. The metaphor of the censorship 
(e.g. Op. cit. p.287) is designed to convey the impre -
sion that the barrier, which the dream-thoughts meet, 
is not merely a static obstacle but something dynamic _ 
something more like a commissionaire turning people 
back from a door than a rail acrose the entrance. 
The dynamic nature of the barrier is to be inferred 
:from the amount of dream_work which appears to ba 
necessary to enable the dream_thoughts to enter 
consciousness (e.g. Op. cit. p.401). For many years 
previous/ 
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previous to the publication of his "Trau'!ldeutung", 
Fraud had spent much of his time in the attempt to 
elucidate the meaning of both his own dreams and thos 
of patients. The results of his analysis of the 
factors enterin8 into dream-formation led him to the 
conclusion that, so far at any rate as the majority 
of adult dreams are concerned, the mental elements 
which seek expression in the dream are prevented from 
reaching consciousness in their original form owing 
to their incompatibility witl1 tl1e conscious aspira_ 
tions of the dreamer (Vide Op. cit. p.l20). It was 
this incompatibility which led to the resistance whic 
the dream-thoughts encountered; and it wa.s this in_ 
compatibility which made the process of distortion 
necessary, if the dream-thOUfpts were to enter 
consciousness at all. Freud had already reached the 
conclusion that the symptoms of hysteria were the 
products of just such a process of distortion, and 
that the rationale of this process was to be found 
in a similar incompatibility between conscious and 
unconscious elements in mental life. It would thus 
seem evident that any theory of repression conceived 
along the dynamic lines indicated by Freud must be 
intimately bound up with the process of distortion 
as illustrated in the dream. It is, therefore, a 
matter of vital importance to determine Whether Freu 
is ri~ht or wrong in attributing the characteristic 
features/ 
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features of the dream to a process of active die_ 
tortion, . I 
Of the modern theories of the dream ~nhich dispanra . 
with the idea of distortion, that of Rivara is the I 
moat noteworthy, Rivers accepts Freud's distinction I 
between the mani:fast and the le.tant content o:(' the ' 
dream ("Conflict and Dream, 1923, p.3. ), but he finds 
himself unable to follow Fraud in attributing the 
change of latent into manifest content to a process 
of distortion. For the term 'distortion' he sub_ 
stitutes 'transformation' (Op. cit. p.4). According 
to this conception, the mani:fast content is spoken of' 
as coming into being through a transformation of the 
latent content. His explanation of the process of 
transformation is dependant upon the general view tha 
mental life is arranged in strata or levels, compar_ 
able to those represented in the nervous system. 
In sleep, the higher levels are in abeyance, and 
only the low·ar levels are functioning. Like Freud, 
he regards the dream of the human adult as intimately 
concerned with mental conflict, but he goes rurther 
in this direction, and finds the essential fm1ction 
of the dream to be "the solution of a conflict by 
means of processes belonging to those levels of 
activity Which are still active in sleep" (Op. cit. 
p.l7). In sleep only the lower levels of experience 
are functioning, and, there:fore, the attempted solu_ 
tion/ 
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solution is necessarily mediated by· those processes 
of thought which are typica.l of the low·er levels. · 
It is the translation of the conflicting elements 
into terms of primitive thought that constitutes 
'transformation' (e. g. Op. ci t. p. 81 ). The appe.rent 
disguise of" the dream-thoughts is,· according to River , 
due to the fact that the primitive ways of thinking 
rela·asad in sleep are unfamiliar to the higher, 
rational processes of thought \~ich characterise 
waking consciousness. 
Whether the characteristic features of the mani_ 
fast dream-content are due to a process like Fraud's 
"distortion" or to a process like Rivers' "transforma 
tion" is a matter of no small importance for our con_ 
capt of repression. Indeed it is hardly an exagger _ 
tion to say that this question constitutes a vital 
issue. According to Freud, the nature of the manifes 
content is determined by the necessity of overcoming 
a resistance to the appearance of the latent content 
in consciousness. According to Rivers, the natura of 
the manifest content is determined by the primitive 
or infantile character of the mental processes Which 
assert themselves when the inhibitory influsnces of 
more evolved mental processes are withdrawn in sleep. 
It is evident, then, that no two dream-theories could 
be more fUndamentally opposed than those of Freud 
and Rivers. According to Freud, the necessity for 
tranaforma tion / 
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tre.ns:formation is a. :function of the conscious; accord 
ing to Rivers, it is a function of the unconscious. 
This :fundamental opposition has its roots in a di:f_ 
ference over the interpretation of the phenomenon 
which Freud describes as "distortion". 
Among the advantages of Rivers' theory may be 
cited:-
1. Its greater simplicity; 2. The :fact that it 
accords with the general impression which a dream 
gives of being of a piece with primitive modes of 
thinking. The use of symbols and the dramatic re_ 
presentation, Which are such prominent features of 
dreams, are in line with what we know of the thought . -
of children and savage races. It is unque.stionable 
that some dreams are capable of being interpretated 
along these lines, particularly war dreams; and, afte 
all, war dreams formed the bulk of the material which 
Rivers studied. On the other hand, any student of 
the subject, who has made a collection of the dreams 
of patients in civil life, must have come across 
innumerable dreams Which are ince.pable of such an 
easy interpretation. An example may be quoted rrom 
a collection of many thousand dreams, which has been 
made by the present writer in the course of psycho_ 
therapeutic practice. This dream, which may be calle 
"The Spaniel Dream", has been selected because it 










exceptionally pointed and dramatic manner. 
I 
It demon_! 
strates the presence of distortion, in that 
movement o~ the dream consists in a gradual 
the Whole! 
break-dowh 
of the trans~ormation_proceas. As the dream progrea_ 
sea, the transformation is undone under our very eyes. 
The gradual break-down of distortion, which is ob- I 
I served, enables us to realise that there really is 
distortion there a.t the start, and that the earlier 
phases o~ the dream are the products o:f just tha.t 
dream-work, of which Freud in~erred the existence, 
and o~ whiCh he ~ound the object to be the concealmenr 
of the real meaning of a, dream :from the dreamer. 
In this case the dreamer was a young woman suffering I 
:from a complex psycho-pathological state, which did 
1 
not con~orm to any o~ the recognised groups, but 
which included obaessional and hysterical ~eatures o~ 
I 
a very advanced kind. She described the dream as I 
I 
"a real nightmare", and it occurred When she vtas on I 
holi~y staying at a boarding-house, Where she met a I 
young man who attracted her interest and with whom 
she went :for several motor_runs. 
The "spaniel" dream. The beginning o~ the dream 
was not well remembered, but it had to do with being 
out ~or a motor-run. Later, the dreamer was in a 
house with some others. A young, black spaniel was 
there also. As the party turned to leave the room, 





arm or bare leg. She could not recall which of these 
limbs it was, but it was held out in a horizontal way 
The dog was trying to take her limb into its mouth, 
but was prevented from doing so by the dreamer, who 
said to it pleasantly, "No, you don't". So fe,r the 
drGam was accompanied by no affect, but now the 
mare part "t?egan. Immediately after she had checked 
the puppy, it became seized by some terrible distress 
It seemed as if its upper jaw had become inverted, 
and it writhed on the ground in terrible agony, wildl 
pleading by a dumb look in its eyes, and holding out 
its front ps,ws for help. It was desperate. to have 
its jaw turned back into the proper position. The 
dreamer felt that the despere.te plight of the animal 
had come about because she had not let it do vrha.t it 
wanted; but she was also conscious of a certain feel_ 
ing of aloofness. She felt very sorry for the animal 
but she did not want to touch it in any way. She 
experienced a callous, "Fate-being-fulfilled" sort of 
feeling. All the time, the dog was writhing on the 
ground, making the most terrible sounds. Then a 
young boy appeared and tried to help by putting a 
stick down its throat several times. This was a 
horrible part of the dream, and unpleasant affect 
became pronounced. It became still more pronounced, 
when the dog, as such, disappeared, leaving behind 
only the throat into which the boy was thrusting hie 
stick./ 
stick. The throat then gradually changed its appear_ 
ance and became just a bir, fleshy openin~, which, 
just as the dreamer awakened, she recognised ae the 
vaginal opening. Durin~ the last phase of the dream, 
the unpleasant affect graduslly increased in intensitr, 
and, when ehe awoke, it wae to find herself in a stat~ 
of abject terror. 
The interest of this dream lies in the extra_ 
ordinarily clear way in Which the undoing of the pro_ 
cess of distortion is depicted. As we follow the 
progress of the dream, we are able to observe the 
dream-work being undone step by step. This enables ? 
us to reconstruct the process whereby the dream.work 
was originally effected. In the ea.rlier part of the 
dream, the centre of interest is an apparently in_ 
genuous symbol - a young , playful black spaniel. 
It ia notable that in this part of the dream there 
is absence of affect. As the dream progresses, the 
dog ' s throat becomes the significant symbol; and this 
development is accompanied by the appearance of un_ 
pleasant affect . The dog ' s body then fades away and 
only the ~apin~ throat is left. Aa the symbolisation 
progressively breaks down, unpleasant affect increase 
in intensity. Eventually symbolisation breaks down 
completely; the meanin~ of the preceding symbols is 
robbed of all uncertainty, and the patient awakes in 
terror. When such a dream is consideren, it is 
i'Tipossi ble I 
1] 1 . 
impossible to doubt that the mani~eet dream in ita 
earlier phases ie the product of the process Which 
breud describes ae "Dream_..vork''. It ie equally im_ 
possible to doubt that this process of dream_work 
partakes essential ly of the nature of "distortion" 
rather than of simple "transformation" . Furt~1er, it 
is impossibls to avoid the impression that the functi n 
of the earllor symbols of the dream ie that of ef~ect 
ing a disguise , and that the obj ect o~ this disguise 
is to hide ~rom the dreamer ' s consciousness the true 
meaning of the dream- thoughts . 
Dreams li ke the ' spaniel ' dream, in which the 
symbolism is seen gradually to break doNn during the l 
course o~ the dream, are a much l ees common phenomeno 
than a dream-series in which each successive dream 
shows l ess and leas evidence of distortion, as the 
dream- thoughts become mor e insistent. such a dream_ 
series may occur during the course of a single night 
or may be spread over sever a l nights . A clear exampl~ 
of such a series is e.~forded by a sequence of t·no 
dreams , which another of the writer •e patients r e_ 
corded as having occurred on the same night . The 
patient in question wee a middle-aged woman , whose 
career a.s a teacher had been seriously compromised by 
a succession o~ break-downs. These tended to occur 
after she had held any post for a time . The lenpth 
of time varied, but in all cases she eventual ly foun 
the I 
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the strain of teaching too much for her and felt corn_ 
palled to resign. She was a good teacher, but she 
would stay up all night in an excess of conscientious 
ness preparing her lessons for the next day. The re_ 
sult was that, in due course, she would become corn_ 
pletely eXhausted and show irritability towards the 
children under her charge. Her memory would desert 
h0r in the class, and she would become dissatisfied 
with herself. She would struggle to continue her war 
to the end of the term, but usually found herself 
quite unable to do so, e.nd had, reluctantly so far 
as her conscious intentions were concerned, to sur_ 
render altogether in a. state of depression. This 
patient was attractive to men, but her casa was corn_ 
plicated by a congenital defect which made merria.ge 
out of the question. She had neither a vagina nor a 
uterus, although it would appear that the clitoris wa 
present and there was every reason to believe that 
the ovarian secretion was not absent~ The two dreams 
in the short series to be quoted were simple in 
character, but this is perhaps no disadvantage for 
demonstrating the point, to illustrate Which they 
ara cited. 
The first dream may be called "The hole in the 
stocking" dream. The dreamer was looking over her 
shoulder at the heel of her stocking. The stocking 
was thick and made of wool:- "Like the old-fashions 
hand-knitted/ 
11~. 
hand-knitted stockings", to quote the dreamer's words 
As she looked at the stocking, she noticed that it wa 
a mass of holes and of run-down stitches. She experi 
enced surprise at the condition of the stocking. 
Thara ware soma people present, and one of' them gave I 
a little laugh, whereupon she said apologetically, I 
"These were new just the other day and ·they were strong 
because of being hand-knitted and being of thick wool~[ 
I cannot understand it". I 
The second dream may be called "The Nudity Dreamf'. 
I 
In this dream, ·the dreamer found herself standing 1 
l naked baf'ora a young nephew. The two ware seriously I 
discussing something of grave import, but no memory I 
of' the subject of' discussion could ba recalled by thal 
dreamer on awaking. All that the dreamer could re_ 
member was that she said to her nephew in a tone of 
reproach "Surely you don't expect me to go like this" 
The deeper meaning of this dream-sequence need 
not be discussed here, but it had a bearing on the 
dreamer's physical disability. What is relevant to 
our discussion, however, is the fact that the holes 
in the stocking in the first dream appear to be the 
symbol of the nakedness which appears in the second 
dream, where symbolism has, partly at any rate, broke 
down. We cannot help regarding the symbolism of the 
first dream as the product of dream-work. It bears 
all the evidence of a process of distortion, and this 
distortion/ 
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distortion would appea·r to be mean~leaa unless ita 
function ia to disguise the true meaning of the dream~ 
thoughts from the dreamer ' s conaciouaneaa. 
When the significance of dreams such aa those 
which have been instanced ia considered, it ia evident 
that the symbolisation partakes of tbe nature of die_ 
tortion rather than of simple transformation. Ita 
essence ia disguise . The interpreta.tion of such 
dreams puts a strain upon Rivers ' theory which it ia 
unable to bear. If dream-symbols are merely the 
natural expression of primitive thinking, it ia dif_ 
ficult to aee why, in the "spaniel" dream, the object 
symbolised successively by the dog, the dog ' s throat, 
and the throat aa such should necessitate a process 
of transformation at all. The object symbolised seem~ 
to be itself a natural symbol for primitive thought _ 
indeed it aeema to be a more natural content of 
primitive thought than of any other kind of thought . 
It ia primitive ' par excellence'. 
/ .. 
It ia true that, according to Rivers' theory, ~~ 
; 
dreams are not simply primitive thinking, but attemptF ,.~ 
to solve conflicts in terms of primitive thinking 
(vide e . g . nconflict and Dream", p . l7) . Even eo , 
however, the only solution which seems to be offered -ia that of disguise: The only ~ction Which trana_ 
formation effects ia to translate the conflict into 
terms in Which ita real ai~nificance ia obscured. 
This/ 
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This may be easier to do on the plane of primitive 
thinking, and presumably this is Why, in normal peopl , 
such phenomena occur typically in sleep - when psych_ 
ical functions are eliminated from above downwards. 
None the less, the value of transformation in the 
attempted solution of conflict seems to be inextricab y 
bound up with the distortion thereby produced. Any 
theory of dreams, therefore, which fails to do juatic 
to the presence of an active process of distortion 
must be regarded as inadequate. 
If this be true, we are driven to a dream-theory 
modelled more after the lines of Freud than after the 
lines of Rivers. We may a.ccept from Rivers the view 
that the dream is a characteristic product of primitiye 
thinking which occurs when the inhibition of super_ 
imposed higher thought-processes is withdrawn; but 
we must recognise the presence, in a very large class 
of dreams, of a definite process of distortion. This 
process of distortion may be a special feature Which 
only occurs when primitive thinking is occupied with 
mental conflict, but, in eo far as it is present, we 
must regard it as evidence of a process of repression 
conceived after Freudian linea. Distortion, of coure , 
is a process which occurs quite readily in primitive 
thinking, because primitive thinking is non_rational 
in character. Wh~n the higher thought-processes are 
active, perha~s "rationalisation" is a more natural 
process/ 
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process than distortion; but, be that e.s it rnay, the 
essence of both processes is to be found in the resis _ 
ance, which seems to oppose the entry into conscious_ 
ness of mental content of a certain kind. When the 
higher processes are active in waking life, this 
resistance manifests itself in a most uncompromising 
way; it does not manifest itself at all readily as 
distortion, beoause distortion is not a natural ex_ 
pression of rational thought. When primitive thought 
processes are released, as in sleep or in cases of 
psychical regression, the resistance manifests itself 
as distortion, beoause, although distortion ie in_ 
compatible with rational thought, it is by no means 
incompatible with non-rational thought. Further, 
the resistance shows itself in lees uncompromising 
form iri distortion .than in any process possible to 
rational thought; and it is for this reason that 
dreams "open up the straightest road to the kno,Nledge 
of the unconscious" (Freud, "Collected Papers", Vol.I 
p.268). It ie for a similar reason that the dream 
has been selected as a field for the study of the 
process of repression. 
It is with a view to throwing ·light upon the 
process of repression that attention has been apeoialfY 
directed to the phenomenon of' distortion in the dream~ 
The dreams quoted seem 1. To prove beyond all questi n 
that distortion does occur in dreams; a. To show tha 
distortion partakes of the nature of repression as 
conceived/ 
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conceived along the lines indicated by Freud. This 
is not to say that all dreams exemplify distortion, o 
for that matter, that repression is a necessary 
of all dreams. On the one hand, distortion may be 
absent because(despite Rivers)there may be no conflict 
finding expression in the dream-thoughts. Wa,king 
consciousness is not necessarily concerned with 
material involving repression; and there is no reason 
to suppose that the dreaming consciousness inevitably 
is so either(whatever Freud may sa.y to the contrary 
in reference to adult dreams). On the other hand, 
distortion may be absent owing to the fact that re_ 
pression has broken down. This is What seems to have 
occurred in the final phase of the 'spaniel' dream. 
I 
It ia to be noted that, when t,hia break-down of re_ I 
pression occurred in the dream, the unpleasant a.ffectl 
became extreme and the dreamer awoke. 
This raises the question of the relation of affe t 
to the dream. It is a striking feature of dreams tha 
situations, which would inevitably provoke emotion in 
waking life, frequently appear to provoke no emotion 
in the dream~ but it is a still more striking feature 
that situations, which would be indifferent in waking 
life so :far as affect is concerned, may be accompanie 
by intense emotion. Thus one of the writer's 
dreamed about jumping from one rock to another acruss 
a roaring torrent of considerable breadth, yet this 
dream/ 
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dream was free of the fear which would undoubtedly 
have been felt if the necessity for such a feat had 
arisen in waking life. On the other hand, in another 
dream the same patient was filled with terror at tha 
sight of an ordinary cushion lying on the floor. 
1
1 
such phenomena are interpreted by Freud as indicating 
that "the dream is less rich in affects than the 
psychic material from which it is elaborated" 
("The Interpretation of Dreams", p. 371). Whenever 
emotion appears in the manifest dream, it is derived 
1 
I 
from the latent dream-thoughts; but absence of emotio
1 
in the manifest dream does not necessarily imply ita 
absence in the thoughts from \Vhich the dream is ele.bo 
rated. Suppression of affect thus comes to be re_ 
garded as a feature of dream-formation, and this 
feature, like that of distortion, is a.ttri buted to 
the action of the censorship, (vide "The Interpretati n 
of Dreams" p.372). Suppression of affect and dis_ 
tortion are thus both products of repression in the 
dreamer's mind. The appearance of affect in the 
dream-consciousness must, therefore, be regarded as 
a failure of repression, just as a breakdown of die_ 
tortion has a like significance. 
Rivers agrees with Freud "that affect may be 
absent or at any rate inappreciable in the ma.nif'eat I 
dream when it is evidently present in the deeper drea 
thoughts of which the manifest dream is the trans_ 
formed/ 
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transformed expression" ("Conflict and DreamH, 
p. Bn-6~). Hie views on the significance of affect 
in the d~eam were ba.aed on his study of anxiety dreamr 
in soldiers suffering from war_neuroeis. In bad caseb 
the nightmare generally occurred as a faithful repro_ 
duction of some terrifying scene of warfare without 
evidence of any transformation. As improvement in 
the patient's condition occurred, it was noticed that 
transformation began to make its a.ppearance. Such 
cases suggested to Rivers that:-
uThere is a definite relation between the amount 
of transformation and the intensity of the af'fectl 
They suggest that the intensity of affect is in_ 
versely proportional to the amount of transforma-
tion, a suggestion in harmony with the view of 
Freud that one of the results of the tranaforma._ 
tion of the latent into the manifest content of 
the dream is to lessen or inhibit its affective 
character." (Op. cit. p.67).· 
He took exception, however, to Freud's theory that 
every dream is a. disguised wish-fulf'ilment. The stu 
o:f war-dreams suggested, on the contrary, that tar_ 
rifying dreams were the expression of painful ·experi_ 
ence which the patient desired not to experience agai • 
From this he concluded that "so far as desire enters 




e, wish, the w·ish not to be subjected to the repeti tior' 
of a painful experience." (Op. cit. p.A8). There was 
thUS a conflict "between a process in Which an exnerill 
ence tends to recur to memory and a desire that the 
experience shall not recur" (Op. ci t., p. A8). 
Attention has already been drawn to Rivers' theory 
that the dream is an attempted solution of a conflict 
in terms of the primitive thinking, which is the only 
thinking available in sleep. In accordance wit.h this 
theory, the anxiety-dream is necessarily regarded e.s 
"a failure of solution" (Op. cit. p.R9). 
We have already seen that Rivers' failure to 
recognise the presence of disguise in dream_transform,._ 
tion vitiated his theory that the dream is simply an I 
attempt to solve mental conflict in terms of primitiv 
thinking; but it is a note.ble fact that both he a.nd 
Freud agree in regarding the appearance of affect in 
the dree.m as due to a. failure of rspression. The 
rationale of the sudden waking of the dreamer from an 
anxiety-dream seems to be that, when the repressive 
processes at the disposal of the dreaming conscious_ 
ness are overwhelmed, the more extensive repressive 
I 
resources of the waking consciousness have to be calli d 
in. The awakening of the dreamer under such con_ 
ditions is of interest for two reasons. First, it is 
of interest because it suggests that distortion 
functions as a process protective of consciousness 
against/ 
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against inroads from the unconscious. It thus he.s its 
1\ 
'raison d'etre' in the conscious (as Freud's theory 
implies), not in the unconscious (as Rivers' ·theory 
implies). Secondly,atudy of the conditions of wakin~ 
from anxiety-dreams leads us to see the superiority I 
of a theory of repression conceived on the B·reudian 
model over Rivers' theory of repression. According 
to Rivers, repression is rea,lly equivalent to inhibit 
ion conceived after the model of modern neurological 
theory ("Instinct and the Unconscious", p.31). The 
, later evolved mental processes repress more primitive 
modes of mental functioning, just as the later evolver 
cortical functions inhibit those of the thalamus and 
sub-cortical structures. When the higher control is 
removed, the repressed ~ctions manifest themselves. 
This way of regarding repression has two implications 
which it is impossible to accept. 
First, if Rivers were right, dream-distortion 
would become a phenomenon, not of repression, but of 
lack of repression. The unsatisfa.ctory nature of thi 
position t)eed. not be elaborated. It follows from the 
conclusion, ':Thich has already been reached, that 
disguise constitutes the essence of distortion. 
Let us turn to the other implication of Rivers' 
view. It is to the effect that repression depends 
upon a distinction between higher and lower mental 
structures. Repression becomes characteristic of the 
action/ 
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action of higher processes as such upon all primitive 
processes which fail to be assimilated by rusion 
(vide Op. cit. p.32). The importance of this die_ 
tinction need not be denied, but it is not a die_ 
tinction which helps us to understand repression. 
Vva have seen that the symbolisation of the anxiety_ 
dream is characterised by disguise. It was this fact 
of disguise that gave Fraud the clue to a distinction 
of infinitely greater value for tha understanding 
of repression than that between "higher" and "lower":L 
I 
r 
viz. the distinction between "conscious" and "uncona_ 1 
cioua". Study of the anxiety-dream shows that the 
function of repression is not to prevent primitive 
mental procaaaea from interfering with higher mental 
processes, but to prevent certain unconscious mental 
processes from disturbing coneciouanaaa:- whether it 
be the primitive conaciouanaea of the dreamer or the 
higher conaciouaneaa of waking life. 
The moat striking feature of the anxiety-dream 
would seam to be (1) the tendency of distortion to 
break.down, (2) the tendency of the dreamer to awake. 
The implications of thaaa facta would seem to be:-
1. That the ~ction of distortion is to prevent 
the appearance in consciousness of mental content, 
the appearance of which would be accompanied by un_ 
pleasant affect; 
2. That, when distortion breaks down and unplaaaa t 
affect does appear in consciousness, this ie a sign 
that/ 
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that tha process of' repression has :failed at the 
primitive mental level of' the dreaming consciousness; 
3. That, When repression fails at a primitive 
level, the higher mental processes, which have been 
in abeyance during sleep, are mobilised and the 
dreamer wakes; 
4. That, when the higher mental processes of' the 
waking consciousness become active, the repressive 
fUnctions of' the sentiments and ideals serve to check 
the :further development of' the repressed content in 
consciousness. 
In the light of' these inferences, Freud's dictum 
that "the dream is the guardian of' sleep, not the 
disturber of' it" ("The Interpretation of' Dreams", p. 
197) must be interpreted as meaning that distortion 
serves the purpose of' preserving consciousness :from 
the unpleasant affect which would result, if' represse 
tendencies succeeded in manifesting themselves in 
recognisable form. We are thus led by the study of' 
the anxiety-dream to the conclusion reached by Freud, 
that repression is a process whereby consciousness 
is preserved from unpleasant affect. (Vide 1 Collecte 
Papers, Vol.IV, p.92). 
This conclusion does not require us to follow 
Freud in adopting a general theory of' psychological 
hedonism. It merely involves our recognising that 
repression is essentially a hedonistic process. It 
is a process whereby unpleasant mental content is kep 
out/ 
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out of consciousness, or, to express the same fact in 
another way, it is a process whereby consciousness is 
enabled to avoid the unpleasant. That a tendency to 
avoid the unpleasant may be a determining factor in 
conduct is too common an observation to ma.ke it neces 
sary to stress the point. Behaviour determined in 
this way is described by psychologists as «appetitive' 
in character (e.g. Draver, «The Psychology of Every_ 
day Life«, p.21). It is a primitive type of be_ 
haviour, which in the human being is normally subord-
inated to the "reactive« type of behaviour, ·:lhich 
characterises the activity of the more highly evolved 
instinctive tendencies, such as aggression, fli~1t 
and sax. It v/ould seem to be appetitive behaviour 
to which Freud refers, when ha says that the "primary' 
mental processes obey the "plaasure_principle". 
(vide «collected Papers, Vol. IV, p.l4 ). No one who 
has any experience of neurotics will deny the possi_ 
bility of finding persona whose conduct is largely 
determined by a tendency to avoid unpleasura. Their 
inability to face the sterner facts of life, their 
liability to break down under strain or responsibilit 
their dilletantism and their inability to tolerate a 
frustration of their desires are all evidence of an 
exaggeration of the natural tendency to avoid un_ 
pleasure. Yet these are the very people Who eXhibit 
the symptoms which have led to the recognition of the 
process of repression. Such phenomena provide 
striking/ 
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striking confirmation of Freud's view of repression 
as a process whereby consciousness is spe.red un_ 
pleasure. Repression is thus seen to be an expressio 
of the general tendency of the organism to avoid the 
unpleasant. 
With this conclusion our enquiry into the essen_ 
tial nature of the process of repression comes to an 
and. The result of our enquiry is to show, that, in I 
general, repression is best conceived along the linea 
indicated by Freud, who originally isolated it as a 
distinct mental proc9ss. 
be defined as follows:-
Repression will accordingl 
Repression is an active mental process whereby 
certain mental elements, the appearance of which 
in consciousness would cause unpleasure, are 
excluded from personal consciousness without 
thereby ceasing to be mental. 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF REPRESSION TO DISSOCIATION. 
The conceptions of dissociation and repression 
have now been subjected to such analysis as has seeme 
necessary to determine their essential nature and to 
enable satisfactory definitions of the two processes 
to be formulated. It now remains to consider the 
relationship between the two processes. Now that the 
ground/ 
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ground has been cleared, this task should not prove 
difficult. If the definition of repression, Which 
has just been given, is compared with the definition 
of dissociation previously reached, it is evident 
that repression is just a special form of dieeociatiop. 
Dissociation was defined as:-
An active mental process, whereby unacceptable 
mental content or an unacceptable menta,l function 
becomes cut off from personal conacioueneee, with 
out thereby ceasing to be mental _ such mental 
content or mental function being "unacceptable" 
within the meaning of this definition if it is 
either irrelevant to, incompatible with, or un_ 
pleasant in relation to an active interest. 
Repression has just been defined as:-
An active mental process whereby certain mental 
elements, the appearance of which in coneciouenee 
would cause unpleaeure, are excluded from persona 
consciousness without thereby ceasing to be 
It is, therefore, obvious that repression is in ita 
essence just dissociation of the unpleasant. 
While, however, repression must be regarded as 
dissociation of the unpleasant, it does not follow 
that all dissociation of the unpleasant is neceesaril 
repression. As e, matter of :fact, the two processes 
are not· co-extensive. Dissociation of the unpleasant 





repression is just a specia.l form which it takes 
certa.in definite conditions. The problem that re_ 
mains is to discover what these special conditions 
are. When we have answered this question, w~ shall 
have determined the exact relationship between the 
two processes. In seeking the answer to our questio , 
we shall do well to look in the direction which has 
already proved so fruitful in our enquiry, and devote 
our attention to the nature of the material involved 
in the process under consideration. Our remaining 
task iB, therefore, to enquire into the psychological 
nature o~ the material involved in the process of 
repression. It is here if anyvrhere that vre ought to 
find the differentia of repression from simple die_ 
sociation of the unpleasant. 
In his earlier writings Freud described repres-
sion as "arising through an unbearable idea having I 
called up the defences of the ego" ("Collected PaperJ', 
Vol.I, p.207). Writing in 190~ of the views which 
he propounded in 1894-A, he says:-
"I had put it forward as a condition of the patho-
genic effectiveness of a given experience that it 
must seem to the ego intolerable and must evoke 
an effort towards defence. To this defence I had 
referred the mental dissociation _ or as it was 
then called, the dissociation o~ consciousness _ 
of hysteria. If the defence succeeded, then the 
unbearable experience and its affective conse_ 
quenoee/ 
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consequences were banished from consciousness and 
from the memory of' the ego." {Op. cit. Vol.I. 
p. 278 ). 
It is thus evident that in his earlier writings Freud 
regarded the repressed material as consisting of' un_ 
-' 
bearable ideas and unbearable experiences with their 
affective consequences. This is in line with his 
I original dictum that "hysterical patients suffer 
principally from reminiscences" - a. dictum Which 
appears in the same paper in Which he first uses the 
I word 11 repress" ("On the Psychical Mechenism of 
I Hysterical Phenomena 11 , written in 1892 and published 
in 1893 under the names of' Breuer and Freud). Tha.t 
Freud should ha.ve originally regarded the repressed 
material as consisting of' ideas and memories is what 
we should expect from the circumstances under which 
he came to formulate the conception of repression; 
for, as Freud points out, it was the resistance of 
unhypnotised patients to the recall of memories that 
led him to recognise the presence of such a process 
{vide Op. cit. Vol.I. p.297-8). 
In Freud's later writings, however, we notice a 
significant change in terminology. In hie later work , 
he speaks less of "ideas" and "memories"a.nd more of 
"impulses", "instincts" and ttunconscious tendenci-es". 
Thus in a paper on "Repression" in 191~ he writes:-
ttone I 
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"One of the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse ma 
undergo is to meet with resistances the aim of 
which is to make the impulse inoperative. Under 
certain conditions, Which we shall presently in_ 
vestigate more closely, the impulse then passes 
into the state of 'repression'"· (Op. cit. Vol. 
IV, p. 84). 
In his later description of repression, therefore, 
what is described as being repressed is not an un_ 
bearable idea but an instinctive impulse, which, by 
the "attainment of its aim", would "produce 'pain'" 
(Loc. ci t. ) This change of terminology, which is a 
feature of Freud's later as contrasted with his 
earlier writings, is highly significant. It indicate 
a movement in the direction of regarding repressed 
material as consisting not in parts of the menta.l 
content, but in elements of mental structure. This 
is well illustrated in a. passage from "Beyond the 
Pleasure-Principle" (first published in 1920), Where 
Freud says:-
"It over and again happens that particular instinc s, 
er portions of them, prove irreconcilable in thei 
aims or demands with others which ca.n be welded 
into the comprehensive unity of the ego. They 
are thereupon split off from this unity by the 
process of repression, retained on lower stages 
of/ 
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of psychic development, and for the time being 
cut off from all possibility of gratification. 
If they than succeed, as so easily happens with 
the repressed sex-impulses, in fighting their way 
through _ along circuitous routes _ to a direct 
or substitutive gratification, this success, 
which might otherwise have brought pleasure, is 
experienced by the ego as 'pain'." ("Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle", 1922, p.a.) ("pain" ~ 
German "Unl us t" ) • 
The realisation that repressed material is corn_ 
posed not so much of idee.s and memories ae of tenden_ 
cies having their ultimate basis in the instinctive 
endowment o~ the individual was, in large part, due 
to an observation, 
analytic technique 
ence was gained. 
Which the exigencies of psycho- .I 
made increasingly clear, as exper1r 
I It was found that the aim of bringing 
the content of the patient's unconscious into consc_ 
iousness was not fully attainable:_ 
"The patient cannot recall all of what lies re_ 
pressed, perhaps not even the essential part of 
it, and so gains no conviction that the conclusio 
presented to him is correct. He is obliged rathe 
to repeat as a current experience what is re_ 
pressed, instead of, as the physician would 
prefer to see him do, recollecting it e.s a :frag_ 
ment of the past." (Op. ci t. p. 17-18). 
This/ 
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This observation, the truth of which has been con_ 
firmed by the present wri tar in his ovrn experience., 
naturally led to a concentration of interest upon ra_i 
pressed tendencies, as against repressed mental con_ I 
tent. Another fact which contributed to this change I 
of view-point was the fact, that not only the re_ 
pressed elements, but also "the motives of the resist 
anoes, and indeed the resistances themselves, are 
found in the process of treatment to be unconscious". 
(Op. cit. p.19). Realisation of the significance of 
the fact, that the resistances are as unconscious as 
the repressed elements, led Freud to amend an in_ 
adequacy in his mode of expression. "We escape 
ambiguity", he says, "if we contrast not the consciou 
and the unconscious, but the coherent ego and the 
repressed •••• We may say that the resistance on the 
part of the analysed person proceeds from his ego" 
(Op. cit. p.l9). The "coherent ego" is, of course, 
part of the mental structure not of' the mental conten • 
It corresponds to what is described in more orthodox 
psychological terms as "The organised self" _ a 
hierarchical organisation of the sentiments and ideal 
based on the fundamental instinctive tendencies. 
If, then, the conception of repression is to be satis 
factorily formulated, it must be expressed in terms 
of mental structure rather than of mental content. 




process whereby certain mental tendencies are denied I 
I conscious expression, if' their incongruity with the 1 
i 
structure of the organised self is such that the I 
I. 






Although Freud in his later works (e. g. ttBeyond i 
I 
I 
the Pleasure-Principle" and "The Ego and the Id") hasj 
been led to realise that repression primarily involvek 
i 
elements of mental structure rather the.n elements of f 
I 
mental content, it must be recognised that his realis~-
1 




is laJrgely due to the fact that his views have been 
elaborated in too great an independence of general li 
psychology. Thus, instead of' using ordinary psycho_ i 
I 
logical terms, he speaks e.g. of· "Repression of e.n j 
instinct-presentation", understanding by this expree_l 
sion "an idea or group of' ideas which is cathected I 
with a def'ini te amount of' the mental enerp:y (libido, I 
I 
I 
interest) pertaining to an instinct". {"Collected 
Papers", Vol.IV, p.91). He thus comes to divide 
the manifestation of an instinctive tendency into a. 
I 
"group of' ideas" and a "charge of' af'f'ect", Which' may I 
be sepa.rated from it and attached to another group ofl 
ideas. This way 6f' speaking of' af'f'ect as if' it were I 
a form of floating mental energy which could be 
attached to this or that part of the mental content 





mental content is only significant in relation to an 
active tendency. The true interprete.tion of phenomen 
of repression, so far as mente.l content is concerned, 
appears to be that mental content is only liable to 
be repressed in so far as it is the expression of 
instinct-interest which is repressed. Thus we can 
only speak of "repressed memories" in the sense that 
memories activated by repressed tendencies ten~ to be 
kept out of consciousness because the tendencies whio 
activate them are themselves denied conscious expres-
sion. 
The reference which ha.s been made to Freud's 
division of "an instinct-presentation" into "a group 
of ideas" and "a charge of affect" ra.ises another 
question besides that of the bearing of repression 
upon mental content. This is the question of the 
relation of repression to affect. Psycho-analytic 
li tere.ture is full of such expression as "unconscious 
hate 11 , ttunconscious love", "unconscious sense of 
guilt". In so f'ar as such expressions imply the 
existence of an emotional state which is unconscious, 
their validity must unquestionably be denied. 
An emotion is a feeling_state, and to speak of an 
unconscious feeling-state is to give voice to an 
absurdity. Freud has discussed this question in a 
paper on "The Unconscious", published in 191n. 
In this paper he writas:-
"We/ 
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''We know, too, that to suppress the dev9lopment of 
affect is the true aim of repression and that.ita 
work does not terminate if this aim is not achisv d. 
In every instance where repression has succeeded 
in inhibiting the development of an affect wa 
apply the term 'unconscious' to those affects 
that are restored when we undo the work of re-
pression. So it cannot be denied that the use 
of the terms in question is logical; but a com_ 
parison of the unconscious affect with the un_ 
conscious idea reveals the significant difference 
that the unconscious idea continues, after re_ 
preaaion, as an actual formation in the System 
Ucs, whilst to the unconscious affect there 
corresponds in the same system only a potential 
disposition which is prevented from developing 
further. So that, strictly speal{ing, a.l though 
no fault be ~ound with the mode of expression 
in question, there are no unconscious affects in 
the sense in which there are unconscious ideas. 
But there may very well be in the system Ucs 
affect-formations Which, like oth~rs, come into 
consciousness." (Op. cit. Vol.IV. p.llO~lll). 
From this quotation it is evident that Freud r.ecog_ 
nises the psychological absurdity of speaking of an 
unconscious or repressed affect, though he gives his 
sanction to the usage for descriptive purposes. The 
usage/ 
usage is certainly convenient, but it must none the 
leas be deprecated, unless it is clearly understood 
to be·nothing more than a ttfacon de parler". Many 
;, 
medical writers - not only psycho-analysts _ have 
confused the issue by speaking as if pent_up emotion 
could be held under repression in the unconsciouA • 
. It must be insisted that, in cases to Which such a 
deecri ption applies, what is repressed is not emotion! 
I 
but a tendency, which, if it reached conscious ex_ 
pression, would give rise to an emotione.l state. 
If then "'.7e must conceive "the repressed" as 
consisting essentially of tendencies belonging to the 
structure of the mind rather than of parts of the 
, menta.l cont9nt, such as "ideas" and "memories", the 
question arises: .. how does this help us to differ_ 
entiate repression from simple dissociation of the 
unpleasant? It helps us, because it directs our 
attention to the source of th~ repressed material. 
We have already noted the fundamental tendency of tl1e 
organism to withdraw from the unpleasant. All organ_ 
isms tend to avoid unpleasant stimuli. In an organis 
with a primitive mentality this process of withdrawal 
seems simple enough. An unpleasant sensory stimulus 
is received, and withdrawal takes place. Even at 
quite a primitive mental level, however, it must be 
assumed that an unpleasant experience leaves some 
of memory-trace, so that, when a similar stimulus is 
received again, the organism's experience is differen 
from what it was on the first ocnasion. One must 
assume/ 
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assume that the second experience of the organism in_ 
.eludes at least a dim sense of familiarity, and that 
behaviour is in some way modified as a result of the 
first experience. Only so is it possible to explain 
that adaptation of behaviour, Which is one of the 
differentia of living organisms from inorganic matter 
Only so, can learning by experience be conceived a~ 
possible. Only so, can the establishment of such a 
phenomenon as a conditioned reflex be envisaged. 
The mental level, at which memory-traces influence 
behaviour solely in virtue of the modification which 
they introduce into the second or subsequent experi_ 
enca o~ a given situation, is described by psychol_ 
ogists as the ffperceptual level" of mental developmen • 
At this level, _memory consists at best in recognition. 
There is no such thing as a memory-image. This is 
the level of mental development which characterises 
the vast majority of living species. For such an 
animal, there are unpleasant perceptions and un_ 
pleasant situations, and these activate behaviour of 
withdrawal; but there is no such thing as an un_ 
pleasant memory or an unpleasant idea. 
A complication is, however, introduced at 
the next level of development, which is characterise 
by the possibility of memory images, and Which 
is described by psychologists as the ffideational"/ 
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"ideational" or "imaginative" level. If the human 
race is excluded from consideration, it would seem 
from experimental evidence that only some of the 
higher animals reach this level of development. 
At this level, behaviour may be modified by the 
explicit revival of memory-images of former experiencrs. 
It is only when this level is reached that dissocia_ I 
tion of unpleasant mental content can be conceived 
in any sense other than is involved in mere with_ 
drawal from an unpleasa.nt stimulus when it is pre_ 
sented. Once this mental level is reached, however, 
the conditions are present, Which render dissocia.tion 
of u~1pleasant mental content possible in the sense 
in VThich the phrase would commonly be understood. 
At this level, it is correct to say that an un_ 
pleasant memory or idea may be "dissociated". It 
would be incorrect, however, to speak of mental con_ 
tent as being "repressed". 
Repression would only appear to be possible Whenl 
. I 
the highest _ the "rational" or "conceptual" _ level 
of mental development is reached. This stage, so far 
as we knovw, is only reached in the case of man. 
The chief characteristic of mental development at 
this level is that ideas can be related to one 
concepts can be formed, consequences ca.n be envisage 
and general principles can be inferred or applied. 




that man's ability to learn by experience is so 
infinitely superior to that of all other living speci s 
known. It is in virtue of these canacities that man 
is able to adapt his behaviour in a manner superior 
to that of "trial and error" learning. It is only 
when this level is reached that it is possible for 
an organism to attain self-consciousness, to apprec_ 
iate the existence of various tendencies within the 
self and to recognise incompatability bet\veen its own 
conflicting tendencies. It is, therefore, only at 
this level, if our analysis of rcpressed·material has 
been correct, that repression becomes possible. 
Repression is only now possible because it is only 
at this level that the conscious expression of a 
tendency incompatible with that organised body of 
sentiments and ideals, Which constitutes the self, 
can be recognised as such. It is only when such a 
tendency is capable of being recognised as incom_ 
patible with the self that its recognition can cause 
unpleasure. 
These considerations lend point to the suggestio 
alreaiy made that it is to the source of the represse 
material that we must look, if we would understand 
w·hat it is that differentiates repression from simple 
dissociation of the unpleasant. In simple dissocia-
tion of the unpleasant, what is dissocia.ted is part 
of/ 
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of the mental content which is felt to be unpleasant 
because of its relation to a prevailing tendency •. 
In repression, what is dissociated is part of the 
mental structure v&ich is felt to be unpleasant be_ 
cause of its relation to the organised self. It is 
only. in the latter instance that we can properly spea. · 
of "conflict" _ a term Which is generally used to 
describe the state which provides the essential con_ 
dition of repression. This difference between re_ 
pression and simple dissociation in relation to the 
source of the'material involved may perhaps be ex_ 
pressed mora pointedly in another way. Whereas in 
simple dissociation of the unpleasant the dissociated 
material is of ex~ernal origin, in the case of repres 
sion the dissociated material is of internal origin. 
At first blush it may seem incorrect to say that 
in simple dissociation of the unpleasant the dis_ 
sociated material is of external origin, if we in_ 
elude under this heading dissociation of unpleasant 
ideas and memories. These are part of the mental 
content; is it not absurd, it may be asked, to say 
that these are of external origin? The answer to 
this question is that it is not absurd, oocause ideas 
and memories have their origin in the experience of 
events which happen to an individual. All the exam_ 
ples of dissociation of the unpleasant, which were 
cited in the section of this thesis devoted to 
"Dissociation«, showed a dissociation of mental 
content/ 
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content determined by events. 'Nhen we speak of 
"The good old times", wha.t are dissociated in our· 
minds are the memories of unpleasant events. The 
same holds true of many of the dissociations witnesse 
in "shell-shock" cases. Our shelving of thoughts 
about our O'.'fn death is determined by our experience 
of the deaths of others. The failure of patients 
suffering from fatal disease to recognise the gravity 
of their own condition is a failure to recognise the 
significance of an event which is happening to them. 
The dissocia.tions of the kind Which occurred to 
Livingstone, when he was being mauled by a lion, are 
all dissocia tions determined by the unplea.sa.ntness of 
events. 
Repression, on the other hand, is exercised in 
relation to tendencies springing from the innate 
instinctive endowment of the individual concerned. 
These tendencies may, of course, be activated by 
situations in which the individual is placed, but 
the menace, against which defence is directed, has 
its roots in the nature of the individual himself. 
It.is the tendencies which he possesses that are 
intolerable, rather than the situations Which provoke 
these tendencies. The danger is internal, not ex_ 
ternal. It is endo-psychic. This is well illustrate 
in the case of the patient whose 'spaniel dream' has 
bean recorded. What provoked the distortion in this 
dream/ 
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drea.m was the presence in the dreamer of' sexual 
desires which were in conf'lict with her i dee.ls and 
sentiments. The object of' repression in such cases 
is to preserve consciousness f'rom the unpleass.nt 
af'fect whirih would result, if the presence of strong 
impulses irreconcilable with the organised self were 
to make itself' f'elt in consciousness. In the dream 
in question the impulses did eventually reach con-
scious expression, with the result that the patient 
awoke in terror _ fear being the natural emotion in 
the presence of any danger whether external or in_ 
ternal in origin. The object of' the distortion in 
the earlier part of the dream was to prevent consciou 
realisation of the unacceptable tendency, which was 
too insistent to be denied expression altogether. 
So long as the signif'icance of' the impulse involved 
was concealed by distortion, unpleasant affect was 
avoided, but, as soon as repression began to break 
down, unpleasant affect began to make its appearance.! 
I 
It is just the appearance of' such unpleasant affect 
that the process of distortion is calculated to 
prevent; and it is in the possibility of' preventing 
the development of such unpleasant affect that the 
ra.tionale of' repression is to be found. 
These considerations lead us to a conclusion 
which ia at first sight paradoxics.l :- the conclusion, 
namely, that what is unpleasant to consciousness 
about the repressed tendencies is the fact that they 
are/ 
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are pleasant. This paradox is realised by Freud, as 
ie evident from the following passage:-
"It is not easy in theory to deduce the poesibilit 
of such a thing aa repression. Why should an 
instinctual impulse suffer such a fa.te? For this 
to happen, obviously a necessary condition must 
be that attainment of its aim by the instinct 
should produce 'pain' instead of pleasure. But 
we cannot well imagine such a contingency. There 
are no such instincts; satisfaction of an in_ 
stinct is always pleasurable. We should have to 
assume certain peculiar circumstances, some sort 
of process which changes the pleasure of satis_ 
faction into 'pain' •••••••• Such a satisfaction 
is pleasurable in itself, but is irreconcilable 
with other claims and purposes; it theref'ore 
causes pleasure in one part of the mind and 'pain' 
in another. We see then that it is a condition 
of repression that the element of avoiding 'pain'l 
shall have acquired more strength than the pleas_ 
ure of gratification." ("Collected Papers", 
Vol.IV, p.84-8n). ('Pain' = 'Unlust' in German). 
What makes the satisfaction of an instinctive impuls 
pain~l is, of course, the fact that it is irreoon_ 
cilable with the organised sentiments and ideals, 
which constitute the main body of the personality. 
The satisfaction of repressed tendencies is pleaaur_ 
able/ 
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pleasurable in itself', but the mere fact that it is 
pleasurable makes it all the more intolerable from th 
point of view of the organised self, with Which the 
tendencies are in conflict. The prime condition for 
the possibility of repression would thus seem to be 
the existence in the mind of instinctive tendencies 
which have not been organised into the hierarchy of 
sentiments and ideals which form the self, although 
they may exhibit a minor organisation o~ t~eir own. 
This seems to be the state of things to vVhich Freud 
intends to refer, when he speaks of a "fixation" 
(vide e.g. Op. cit. Vol.IV, p.B~). Another term, 
which is comrr;only used in this connection in psycho-
pathological literature, is the word "complex". 
This word was originally introduced by Jung of z-llrich 
to designate minor organisations of instinctive 
tendenc~es which are out of relation to the main 
personality and which thus remain unconscious. The 
word has since been used by McDouga.ll, Bernard Hart 
and others as equivalent to "sentiment", but it seems 
to be more use~lly employed in its original sense, 
a.s indicating a minor organisation of tendencies out 
of relation to the sentiments and ideals, and so 
liable to repression. Where such indep-endent organ_ 
isations as the complex assume a more extensive form, 
they would seem to constitute those "secondary 
personalitiesu to which Morton Prince and others 
have/ 
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have devoted so much painstaking investigation. . 
1 It would seem that any instinctive tendency is theor_ 1 
etice,lly capable of leading to complex-formation and 
so provoking the process of repression, but, since 
r'-
the sex instinct is, of all the instinctive tendencie , 
tha.t most di:f:ficul t to assimilate into the peraonali t~ 
in the modern civilised world, it is the tendencies 
related to this instinct that seem to be most fre_ 
quently invol ved• Freud goes so fe.r as to say that 
the sex-tendencies are involved in every case; but, 
although the psycho-neuroses of civil life seem to 
afford evidence in favour of his viev.r, the experience 
of war seem to show that tendencies of self-preserva_ 
tion are capable of functioning in a ma.nner so much 
at variance with the organised self as to provide 
occasion for repression. 
Whatever the exact nature of the tendencies 
involved, however, the essential feature of the pro_ 
cess of repression remains unaffected. Its nature 
is best understood in the light of' the term, which 
Freud originally employed when he first isolated the 
process -viz. that of "defence". Defence, however, 
is a feature which repression shares with all forms 
of dissociation of the unpleasant. The difference 
bet,.veen repression and simple dissociation of the 
unpleasa.nt lies in the fact, that in the first case 
the menace, from which protection is sought, is of 
internal/ 
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internal origin, whereas in the second case it is 
only of external origin. In simple dissociation of 
• I 
the unpleasant, the defence is directed age.1nst menta~ 
content determined ultimately by events that happen 
to the individua1. In repression, the defence is 
directed a8ainst tendencies which form part of the 
mental structure of the individual himself. 
The distinction, which has now been established 
between repression and other forms of protective die_ 
sociation, enables us to understand two cha.racteristi 
features of repression, which have led many writers 
to regard it as a completely separate process. They 
are:-
1. The relatively permanent che,ra.cter of its 
effects. 
2. The high degree of activity which it seems 
to involve. 
As regards the first of these features:- the 
relatively permanent character of repression as corn_ 
pared with other forms of protective dissociation is 
readily understood, once we recognise that, in the 
case of repression, the source of danger is endo_ 
psychic. The source of the unpleasant affect v(hich 
is threatened, and from which defence is sought, is l 
to be traced ultimately to the instinctive tendencies 
and these form part of the permanent structure of the 
mind. Freud picturesquely describes the source from 
which/ 
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which these tendencies spring as the "Id" ("The Ego 
and the Id", 1927, p.28), but this term merely exam_ 
plifies the confusion which results, when attempts 
are made by medical writers to explain mental pro_ 
cesses in independence of general psychology. The 
}'Id" is an unnecessary and redundant term for what 
are familiar to psychologists as the innate instinct_ 
dispositions. It is ti1e permanence of the instinct_ 
dispositions, which gives rise to the impression 
of the relative permanence of the effects of repres-
sion. 
As regards the high degree of activity which 
strikes the observer as characterising the action of' 
repression, this is also traceable to the source of 
the material. It was probably the contrast between 
the enormous amount of activity, which appears to 
be involved in repression, and the relatively small 
amount of-activity, which appears to be involved in 
simple protective dissociation, that led McDougall 
to remark "Dissociation terminates conflict; but 
repression, in itself', does not" ("An Outline of' 
Abnormal Psychology", p. 226 ). Vle have already in_ 
dicated that "conflict" is only applicable where 
repression is concerned; but, be that as it may, the 
high degree of activity involved in repression is 
readily intelligible in the light of' the enormous 
amount of energy with which the instinct-dispositions 
are/ 
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are endowed by nature. It is because these instinct_ 
tive tendencies are, biologically speaking, the dyna ·c 
of all action, that, when any of them is repressed, 
repression must necessarily involve a degree of 
activity which is found in no other form of dissocia_ 
tion. 
CONCLUSION. 
No\V that the relationship between repres_ 
sion and dissociation ha.s been determined, the task 
which ti1e writer set before him in his thesis is con_ 
eluded. All that remains to be done is to summarise 
the conclusions reached. 
SUMMARY. 
1. The conception of dissociation has been subjected 
to examination, and the conclusion has been 
reached that dissociation should be regarded as:-
An active mental process, whereby unacceptable 
mental content or an unacceptable mental functio. 
becomes·cut off from personal consciousness, wit 
out thereby ceasing to be mental - such mental 
content or mental function being regarded as 
unacceptable if it is either irrelevant to , 
incompatible/ 
148. 
incompatible with or unpleasant in relation to 
an active interest. 
2. The conception of repression was then considered, 
with the result that repression was found to be:_! 
An active mental process, whereby certain mental 
elements, the appearance of which in consciousnes 
woul:i cause unpleasure, are excluded from persona, 
consciousness without thereby ceasing to be menta[. 
On the assumption that these conclusions regard_ 
J) 
ing the essential nature of the two processes are 
correct, it follows that repression is to be 
classed with dissociation of the unpleasant. 
4. The consideration of various phenomena illus_ 
trating repression and dissociation of the un_ 
pleasant showed that repression is a special .form 
of dissociation of the unpleasant:- viz., that 
form which occurs When the dissociated elements 
consist of tendencies belonging to the instinctiv 
endowment and thus forming part of the structure 
of the mind itself. 
n. This last conclusion led to a modification of the 
definition of repression, as a result of which i 
came to be regarded as:-
A process Whereby certain mental tendencies are 
denied conscious expression, if their incongruit 
with/ 
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with the structure of the organised self is such 
that the conscious expression of these tendencies 
would cause unplea.sure. 
6. This ~inal definition of repression suggests tiLat 
whereas the term "mental conflict" is applicable 
to conditions giving rise to repression, it is 
not applicable to the conditions which give rise 
to other forms of dissociation. 
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS THrnSIS. 
--------------~-=======~~====,~=~ 
Attention may be directed to certain features 
o~ this thesis, Which the writer believes to con_ 
stitute original contributions to the subject under 
discussion. These are:-
I. The analysis of dissociation-phenomena into 
three categories depending on the nature of the 
mental elements dissociated. These categories are 
(a) dissociation of the irrelevant, (b) dissociation 
of the incompatible, (c) dissocia.tion of' the un_ 
pleasant. 
II. The view that repression is:-
(a) a special form of dissociation of the 
unpleasant. 
(b) differentiated from other forms of die_ 
aociation of the unpleasant in virtue of the fact tha ; 
in/ 
I no. 
in the case o:f repression, the dissociated elements 
consist essentially in tendencies belon~ing to the 
mental structure, Vfhereas in other forma of dissocia_ 
tion o:f the unpleasant the dissociated elements con_ 
sist in part o:f the mental content. 
